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Introduction
RATIONALE OF THE STUDY
It is widely assumed today that the USSR
and the United States are destined to ex-
perience a rather prolonged relationship of
what has come to be called &dquo;peaceful co-
existence&dquo; but which might better be char-
acterized as &dquo;cornpetitive coexistence.&dquo;
This assumption carries with it an image
of intensive competition in the diplomatic,
economic, and propaganda fields, combined
with a rather different sort of competition
in the military field. Whereas the nonmili-
tary competition is likely to be perceived
on both sides as essentially a series of zero-
sum games in which the win-or-lose payoffs
are important but not particularly crucial
or final, the competition in weaponry and
strategy-because of the extreme disutili-
ties of certain possible payoffs-is likely
to be regarded as more of a non-zero-sum
affair. The implication is that the serious-
ness and finality of the perceived payoffs
in the military competition will lead to the
mutual adoption of certain forms of &dquo;co-
operation&dquo; within the competitive frame-
work, and that the adversaries will find it
possible to envisage intermediate outcomes
of a basically win-win nature. In the eco-
nomic and diplomatic realms, each side can
still afford to pursue victories, because such
victories are still meaningful and because
defeat is far from final.
Thus, when we speak of deterrence in
the military field, we have reference to the
adoption of strategies dominated not by
win-the-war objectives but by prevent-the-
war objectives. Or to be more realistic, we
may at least speak of strategies that repre-
sent some form of compromise between
win-the-war and prevent-the-war doctrines.
In many ways this is the essence of a rela-
tionship that we characterize as one of
mutual deterrence.
If the above assumptions are generally
correct, it follows that both major powers
must take great care to &dquo;cooperate&dquo; in es-
tablishing and maintaining a high degree of
stability in their relationship. This effort
must include (1) steps to minimize the
likelihood of either side being led to believe
that the other has adopted, or is about to
adopt, a win-the-war move; and (2) steps
to assure that if one side does so opt, the
other is not too seriously disadvantaged.
Such a relationship, based as it is on the
need for a sophisticated and continuing ex-
change of signals, on the reliability of ex-
pectations, and on approximate qualitative
and quantitative parity in military technol-
1This brief statement is spelled out at
greater length in chapters 2-5 of Singer (1962).
An essentially similar position is found in much
of the contemporary literature on stable deter-
rence.
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ogy, is extremely delicate and highly prone
to instability.2 This instability need not,
however, prove fatal; delicate as it may be,
its preservation seems to be clearly within
the bounds of probability. Moreover, there
are certain things that each side can do to
enhance and maximize whatever inherent
stability the relationship of mutual deter-
rence may hold.
Perhaps one of the most promising of
these is to develop as accurate an image as
possible of the other’s foreign policy opera-
tional code. The more clearly each sees
the other’s assumptions, expectations, and
preferences, the less likely one is to make
the move that leads the other to upset the
tenuous balance. If each is committed to
the avoidance of strategic war (more par-
ticularly, general nuclear war), such &dquo;com-
plete&dquo; information should be highly valued
by its decision-makers as bases for the de-
velopment of rational strategies. The more
accurately each perceives the other, the less
likely either is to develop the &dquo;wrong&dquo; type
of weapon system, to stockpile an inappro-
priate quantity of hardware, or to deploy
men or material in a manner that is provoc-
ative rather than deterrent.
Likewise, similar benefits may be ex-
pected to flow from a conscious awareness
of one’s own assumptions, expectations, and
preferences. Not the least of the latter
benefits is an awareness of the presence or
absence of symmetry in these variables. For
example, one of the factors that tends to
push decision-makers into increasingly belli-
cose (and destabilizing) behavior is a high
level of perceived dissimilarity between
oneself and the adversary. The more con-
vinced one is of the divergencies and incon-
gruences between the two sides, the greater
the inclination to believe in inevitable
clash, and the less the inclination to engage
in stability-conserving behavior. Considera-
tions such as those noted here provide, then,
the rationale for seeking the information
described below.
INFORMATION SOUGHT IN THE STUDY
In this study we are trying to produce
certain information that will help to gen-
erate as accurate a picture as is possible of
both the Soviet and the American foreign
policy operational codes during the period
1957-1960. We have established 35 di-
mensions on the attitudes of the foreign
policy elites, and have divided these dimen-
sions into four basic issues:
A. How does each side’s foreign policy
elite perceive and evaluate the international
political system-the environment in which
the deterrent relationship must be main-
tained ?
B. What is each foreign policy elite’s
evaluation of the contemporary and predict-
able distribution of power?
C. How does each elite evaluate the for-
eign policy operational code of its adver-
sary ?
D. What are the main characteristics of
each elite’s articulation of its own opera-
tional code?
We are interested not only in where the
two sets of elites &dquo;come out&dquo; on these four
issues, but the degree of salience each di-
mension has for these elites. Conceivably,
the frequency with which particular items
are discussed reflects the relative impor-
tance of these items to the people who
formulate and articulate a nation’s foreign
policy. Thus, both in the text and in the
2 Not all observers would concur on the im-
portance of military parity and, indeed, many
American strategists would consider any loss
of our preponderance to be a destabilizing fac-
tor. Implicit in that view, moreover, is a rejec-
tion of the mutuality of the deterrent relation-
ship.
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supplemental Tabulated Coding Results the
reader will find a simple measure of sali-
ence for each dimension; i.e., the number
of times an elite articulation on the matter
at hand appeared in each periodical.3 3
Before going into the specific dimensions
of these four basic issues, it should be
stressed that we are seeking exactly the
same sort of data for each side, and that
the attitudinal framework of the study itself
is not a &dquo;we-they&dquo; sort of focus. Rather it
is a focus in which the researcher proceeds
from the assumption that here are two
major powers (A and B, X and Y, or United
States and USSR) engaged in a very risky
set of relationships, and that the more ob-
jective and accurate a picture each has of
the other’s operational code, the less risky
the relationships become. Our purpose is
to help provide that information, and not
to pass judgment on the code or conduct
of the states involved. (This does not pre-
clude, however, a &dquo;shifting of hats&dquo; in the
conclusion, where certain policy implica-
tions for the United States are discussed.)
It should also be pointed out that we are
focusing on what might be called &dquo;elite
articulations,&dquo; and that such a focus implies
certain limitations. First of all, it raises the
question of properly identifying those who
compose the foreign policy decision-making
elite in each of the two nations under study.
Second, it raises the question of whether
articulations, expressions of opinion, and
statements of policy are particularly reliable
indices of actual policy behavior. Both of
these problems will be dealt with in greater
detail later, but it seems worthwhile to at
least forewarn the reader at the outset.
Let us now return to the four basic issues
on which information is being sought and
attempt to spell out in greater detail the
nature of the information desired and the
reasons behind the search.
A. Image of the International Environment
Here we are operating from the well-
founded propositions: (1) that individ-
uals (alone or in groups) always have some
image of their environment and that this
image is an attempt to impose some accept-
able (and, to them, rational) structure and
order upon the world in which they must
operate; and (2) that this image or at-
tributed structure is a key determinant in
their behavior. Thus we feel justified in
attempting to identify such general and
persistent dimensions in each elite’s image
of the international environment as:
A-1. Whether harmony or conflict is the
dominant attribute of the contemporary in-
ternational system as they see it.
A-2. Whether their mutual relationship
is viewed as a struggle between ideologies,
social systems, or power centers.
A-3. Whether war is perceived as most
likely to arise-if at all-out of one state’s
aggressiveness, the normal clash of national
interests, or accident and miscalculation.
A-4. Whether they believe that nations
with differing sociopolitical characteristics
must clash, may compete, or can cooperate.
A-5. Whether they think of prediction
about international events as highly pos-
sible or almost impossible.
A-6. Whether they think that nations
have much, or little, control over their own
destinies.
3It might be argued that a more "sophisti-
cated" measure of salience is in order, but
given the wide range of Ns among the dimen-
sions (from 2 to 156 for the USSR and from 5
to 471 for the US), any other measure would
be artificial and misleading. There are 1,618
references in the Soviet sample and 3,105 in
the American one; dividing by 35, we get
means of 46 and 89 respectively. In the final
section of this study some further comparisons
of salience are offered.
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A-7. Whether the broad trends in the dis-
tribution of power are favorable or unfav-
orable to them.
A-8. Whether any limited war is suscep-
tible to restraint and limitation or whether
it is more likely to escalate into general war.
When we study the results of these par-
ticular inquiries we will find that, while
such information could be highly useful and
relevant to each side, neither elite seems to
give much expression to such theoretical
and philosophical generalizations; this is
particularly true of the first six, more ab-
stract, items.
B. Evaluation of the Power Balance
Here we leave the more abstract and
general characteristics that each side’s elite
tends to attribute to the international politi-
cal environment, and turn to some of its
more concrete present-day characteristics.
The focus here is on the way in which each
appraises its power and capabilities vis-a-
vis the other, and the premise is that per-
ceived superiority or inferiority is bound to
affect the behavior of the elites involved.
We are not saying, however, that the more
powerful an elite thinks it is-or is becom-
ing-the more aggressive or bellicose its
behavior will be; we are most skeptical of
postulating any one-to-one relationship be-
tween perceived power and propensity for
conflict.
In this group of dimensions we seek to
discover each side’s evaluation of the cur-
rent and foreseeable power balance in terms
of the following:
B-1. Vulnerability of own strategic strike-
back capability.
B-2. Limitations and effectiveness of own
deterrent posture.
B-3. Relative progress in military tech-
nology and production.
B-4. Overall military capability vis-a-vis
the other.
B-5. Strengths of own alliances.
B-6. Effectiveness of other’s decision-
making process.
B-7. Dominant forces in other’s decision-
making process.
B-8. Impact of arms expenditure on
other’s economy.
B-9. Vulnerabilities of other’s sociopoliti-
cal structure.
B-10. Outcome of general nuclear war.
C. Evaluation of Other’s Operational Code
In this realm we are interested in discov-
ering how each elite perceives and evalu-
ates the operational code of its adversary.
Again the assumption is, to paraphrase the
game theorists, that &dquo;each player’s strategy
is a function of the other’s strategy,&dquo; or,
more accurately, the perception of the
other’s strategy. Here we seek to identify
the way in which each sees the goals, moti-
vations, capabilities, and strategies of the
other in terms of the following dimensions:
C-1. Their ultimate and dominant polit-
ical goals.
C-2. Their relative preference for physi-
cal security and ideological consistency.
C-3. Their relative preference for vari-
ous foreign policy techniques and instru-
ments.
C-4. The basis for attributing aggressive
designs to the adversary.
C-5. Their dominant military doctrine.
C-6. The purposes of their outer space
programs.
C-7. The purposes of their foreign aid
programs.
D. Own Operational Code
In this fourth and final group of dimen-
sions, we hope to identify the major char-
acteristics of each elite’s foreign policy
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operational code. And it is here that we run
into our most important epistemological
problems. It is relatively easy to say that
this is how a group sees the environment,
evaluates the power balance, or appraises
the other side, but it quite another thing to
say that this is the mode of behavior of a
group. In other words, such relatively ob-
servable phenomena as perceptions are not
too difficult to identify and measure; but
goals, motivations, and preferences pose a
more formidable problem. One may infer
them from actual behavior, or one may
infer them from what the actors say about
them, but in each case we are compelled to
reply upon the intelligent inference.4 Fur-
thermore, it is generally true that an individ-
ual or a group is never fully aware of the
forces that make for its own behavior, even
though it may be quite aware of these
forces in the behavior of others. Finally,
there is the problem of dissimulation in any
of its myriad aspects. An elite may articu-
late in order to generate an image, persuade
an audience, demonstrate solidarity, plead
a case, or merely blow off steam. Despite
these pitfalls, however, we felt the study
would be seriously incomplete were it to
omit any effort to infer the operational code
of each elite from its own articulations. We
examine these in terms of the following
dimensions:
D-1. The general criteria used in making
foreign policy decisions.
D-2. The prerequisites for successful
negotiation.
D-3. The way in which peace can best
be maintained.
D-4. The applicability of limited war in
pursuit of strategic interests.
D-5. The political settlement-disarma-
ment sequence.
D-6. The arms reduction-inspection con-
trol sequence.
D-7. Decision-making procedures in in-
ternational organization.
D-8. The various disengagement pro-
posals.
D-9. The motivation for foreign aid pro-
grams.
D-10. Free international trade.
Procedures
METHOD AND SOURCES EMPLOYED
IN THE STUDY
Having discussed the reasoning behind
the study and the sorts of information that
it was designed to produce, let us turn to
the question of what materials were em-
ployed in this search for information. As
suggested earlier, one can seek to identify
the major characteristics of a state’s foreign
policy operational code in several ways.
One may examine the overt behavior itself
and then reconstruct by inference the as-
sumptions, expectations, aspirations, and
calculations that entered into and influ-
enced that behavior. Or one might refine
and limit this technique by selecting a
single variable or cluster of variables and
then attempting to interpret and explain
past and current behavior in terms of that
variable. In this vein, one might choose
such &dquo;objective&dquo; factors as geography, lo-
cation, resources, the diplomatic or military
history of a nation, its productive and dis-
tributive system, or its level of technology,
to mention but a few. Or one may opt for
the less tangible factors such as religion,
4Perhaps the best discussion of the problem
of inference in content analysis is in George
(1959), especially chapter 4. The present
study has been strongly influenced, and to a
great extent made possible, by the work of
George and his colleagues in the Foreign
Broadcast Intelligence Service of the Federal
Communications Commission.
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literature, formal ideology,5 or national
character. Interestingly enough, in this age
of motivation research, psychoanalysis, and
attitude manipulation, there has been an
increasing tendency toward these latter
bases of explanation. The approach seems
legitimate enough, but some very serious
difficulties arise and it is our suspicion that
many of these have been ignored or evaded
by those who utilize the more attitudinal
types of interpretation.
Thus, without contradicting the notion
that beliefs and attitudes are clearly influ-
ential in the foreign policy behavior of
states, we might nevertheless ask such ques-
tions as whose beliefs are influential; how
do we know that they believes what they
say they believe; and if there are contradic-
tions in statements of belief, which state-
ments are to be used? In other words, there
is a genuine problem of validity in any re-
search design that seeks to identify beliefs,
and this problem has been the subject of
considerable reflection and difference of
opinion among users of the content-analy-
sis technique.~ 6 Keeping these caveats in
mind, let us proceed to a description and
explanation of the type of attitudinal data
utilized in this study and to the nature of
the sample that has been drawn from the
data.
First, our concern is with those whom
we believe to be most influential in the
formulation of Soviet and American politi-
cal and military strategy-the elites who
most accurately make and/or express the
operational code.7 Second, we wanted to
identify those written materials that would
most faithfully reflect the assumptions, ex-
pectations, and aspirations of those elites.
Third, because of the complexity of our
method (to be described momentarily), we
had to draw a relatively small sample of
the elite articulations with which we are
concerned.
Given these requirements, we decided
that an adequately faithful mirroring of our
two elites could be had by focusing upon
three periodicals on each side. After con-
siderable discussion, consultation, and pre-
testing, we selected for the USSR: Pravda,
a daily newspaper published in Moscow,
organ of the Central Committee of the
Communist party of the Soviet Union
(CPSU); Kommunist, a monthly journal
published in Moscow, the theoretical spokes-
man for the Central Committee; and Inter-
national Affairs, a monthly journal pub-
lished in Moscow in several languages.
And for the United States, we selected:
The New York Times, a privately published
daily newspaper, most widely confided in
and read by the governmental and quasi-
governmental decision-making elite; The
Department of State Bulletin, the weekly
official organ of the executive agency most
deeply involved in foreign policy; and For-
eign Affairs, a quarterly journal privately
published by the Council on Foreign Rela-
tions in New York.
Some defense of our selections is in order.
First of all, there was a considerable temp-
tation to use at least one military periodical
5See especially Leites (1951 and 1953).
Though Leites asserts that he is not inferring
actual behavior from articulations of formal
ideology, the frequent use of "operational code"
and the general tone of both studies suggest
that the prefatory caveats are partially ignored
throughout.
6 An excellent volume dealing with these and
other implications in content analysis is Pool
( 1959). See also the classic study by Berelson
(1952) and the valuable effort by George
(1959), already cited, to combine technique
and substance.
7 It could be argued that these may not nec-
essarily be the same people, but we assume
that they are.
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on each side, but it was soon established
that no journal on the Soviet side would
have frequent enough reference to the broad
range of dimensions with which we were
concerned; the material is so restricted in
scope that it might be useful for a study in
strategic doctrine alone,8 but not for a study
in which military strategy is only one seg-
ment of the broader spectrum with which
the study is concerned. Moreover, the only
Soviet military journal whose scope and level
of generalization might have been adequate
for our purposes is Military Thought, and be-
cause the USSR has classified it, it was nearly
impossible to get access to more than a few
scattered issues. Such media as Red Star,
Soviet Fleet, Military Knowledge, Naval
Journal, and Soviet Union were all too
restricted in their materials, as were their
American counterparts.
Another problem was whether or not to
restrict our sample to that of official gov-
ernmental publications. On the Soviet side
this presented no real difficulty, as almost
nothing in the foreign affairs field is pub-
lished there that does not reflect govern-
mental policy, and this in turn is a function
of Party policy.9 Thus we chose Pravda for
its breadth of coverage and for its faith-
fulness in reflecting the Party line. Kom-
munist, likewise a Party journal, was se-
lected because of its greater concern for
the theoretical, the doctrinal, and the ab-
stract. And because neither Pravda nor
Kommunist is primarily devoted to foreign
affairs, and hence might often fail to pro-
duce data on some of our more specialized
dimensions, we decided to use International
Affairs to fill that gap. The latter also has
the virtue of appearing in English as well
as in Russian, thus reducing our transla-
tion and coding burden.10
On the American side, we did decide to
go outside of government for two of our
three journals because the foreign policy
elite is not restricted to government or party
elites. No student of American politics
could deny the significance of the New
York Times as a reflector of elite opinion
on foreign policy; not only do some of its
employees occasionally participate (infor-
mally, for the most part) in foreign policy
making, but its editorials are viewed by
most policy-makers as singularly reflective
of nongovernmental elite opinion. Foreign
Affairs is likewise the outlet for many for-
eign policy influentials both in and out of
government; its parent organization, the
Council on Foreign Relations, enjoys a re-
markable intimacy with official policy-
makers. And this latter journal supplements
the more detailed day-to-day commentary
of the Times by producing a number of
theoretically-oriented but policy-focused
articles in each issue. The Department of 
State Bulletin is, of course, indispensable as
the primary source of policy articulations
from the middle as well as the upper levels
of the diplomatic bureaucracy.
It might be said that Pravda and the
Timers editorials provide the more immedi-
ate day-to-day coverage we required, Kom-
munist and Foreign Affairs provide the
theoretical and more long-range articula-
8 Even this is problematical, as most of the
military journals still tended (in the late 1950s)
to concentrate on the more restricted questions
of tactics, training, and equipment.
9 Very suggestive in this regard is Inkeles
(1951).
10It is occasionally suggested that certain
intentional omissions and modifications are
made when such periodicals are translated for
foreign consumption. Though this seems plaus-
ible, only two of the specialists we consulted
seemed to think this happens with any fre-
quency, and in a rough comparison made by
one of our bilingual coders, no such evidence
was found.
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tions demanded by our code dimensions,
and International Affairs and the Bulletin
give us the exclusive preoccupation with
foreign policy and thus the subject matter
breadth so necessary to this type of study.
But these pairings ought not to be taken too
literally as indications of extreme similarity;
the many differences should be evident
Finally, the implied symmetry between
the two societies should not be interpreted
as overlooking the disparate roles of the
media in each. We readily recognize the
sharp difference between the objectives of
in forming the reader and persuading the
reader, but nevertheless conclude that the
net results are not profoundly different.
Moreover, none of the American samples
used here can be thought of as having a
primarily in f ormative role; all three are, to
put it mildly, interpretive in their mission.12
DRAWING THE SAMPLE
Once the basic decision is made as to
what materials will be employed in a study,
the question arises as to how to sample from
among these materials in an appropriate
fashion. As in all sampling problems, we
were confronted with the not always com-
patible demands of selectivity and random-
ness. Let us describe how we dealt with
the need for selectivity first.
In each of the six periodicals used, we
wanted to code only those articles or edi-
torials that would produce the information
described in the sections on the findings of
the study, and were therefore interested in
excluding a great many items from each.
Such inclusions and exclusions are listed
below.
Pravda: Because no effort is made to dis-
tinguish in content between editorial and
reportorial material in this newspaper, we
coded all articles that (1) were &dquo;primarily
concerned&dquo; with Soviet foreign relations
and (2) contained any &dquo;interpretive mate-
rial.&dquo; This excludes mere factual reports,
and because interpretive articles were both
lengthier and more prominent, decision to
code or not code an article was relatively
simple. There was high agreement between
two independent coders on the number of
codable items in this newspaper.
Kommunist,: All articles in this journal
were coded that (1) were primarily con-
cerned with Soviet foreign relations (thus
excluding such items as relations between
satellite nations, literature in China, etc.)
and (2) were written by Soviet nationals.
Authors were generally easily identifiable.
jfM~mdMM~ A~K~: Because almost allInternational in this journal deal almost theof the rt cles in this journ deal with 
subject at hand, we coded only the single
editorial and the lead article; if there were
two editorials, the first was coded. Occa-
sionally, in place of the editorial there
might be the text of an important speech or
an exchange of letters; these were coded as
if they were editorials.
New York Times: Editorials primarily
concerned with American foreign relations
were the only items coded. If there were
two or more of these on a given day, only
the first was coded.
Department of State Bulletin: We coded
only those articles that were significant
enough to be listed in the index of the issue,
under the name of the official to whom the
statement was attributed; statements or
articles by foreigners were excluded. By
limiting ourselves to indexed items, we ex-
cluded all straight factual items.
Foreign Affairs : In this quarterly jour-
nal, all articles were coded that were (1)
11On the general problem of cross-national
comparability in the media, see Pool et al.
(1952), especially chapter 1, justifying their
selection of journals to be studied.
12This issue is discussed in Singer (1963b).
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primarily concerned with American foreign
policy (thus excluding articles that focused
on another given nation or region) and (2)
written by American nationals or foreigners
whose occupation and residence indicate a
basically American viewpoint. All authors
are clearly identified in each issue.
To reduce the size of our coding uni-
verse, once selection for appropriateness had
occurred, we decided on a random sample
as follows: Pravda, every eighth day; Kom-
munist, every issue (more or less monthly);
International Affairs, every issue (monthly);
New York Times, every eighth day; Depart-
met of State Bulletin, every issue (weekly);
Foreign Affairs, every issue (quarterly).
TIME SPAN COVERED
The time span covered in our coding was
the three-year period beginning May 1,
1957 and ending April 30, 1960-which
was, coincidentally, just prior to the U-2
incident, the summit breakup at Paris, and
the subsequent alterations in the nature of
Soviet-American relations. It is important
to bear in mind that this was essentially a
period of relatively stable and &dquo;normal&dquo;
relations; and, while the &dquo;peaceful coexis-
tence&dquo; doctrine was not abandoned after
the closing of our three-year sample period,
it became a less strong and dominant ele-
ment in Soviet foreign policy articulations.
There may also be some significance in
these facts: ( 1 ) by the beginning of our
period, May 1957, Khrushchev had rather
successfully consolidated his power and
authority in the Soviet government and in
the Party, and (2) John Foster Dulles was
United States Secretary of State during
nearly two of these three years. The reader
should bear in mind how rapidly change
is occurring in world politics and that, even
though the present tense is used in the
analysis, the midpoint of the sampled period
was six years ago.
CODING PROCEDURES
Here we turn to the most important of
our preliminary explanations, prior to an
examination of the data themselves. As
was indicated in the section on information
sought in the study, the purpose of the
study was to generate an accurate picture
of Soviet and American foreign policy goals
and strategies as far as they might be re-
flected in elite articulations regarding (A)
the international environment, (B) the dis-
tribution of power, (C) the other’s opera-
tional code, and (D) their own operational
code.
The procedure followed two main phases:
designing and refining our coding proce-
dure, and then applying it. The first phase
followed six more or less distinct steps:
(1) The questions that seemed most
germane to the study at hand were com-
piled. These were, of course, based on a
multiplicity of sources: the author’s gen-
eral knowledge of the subject, the param-
eters of his own conceptual schemes, and
those dimensions of foreign policy sug-
gested by the writings and research of
others in the field.13
(2) Once a tentative set of essentially a
priori dimensions was set up and arranged,
these dimensions were discussed, criticized,
and modified by the author, his assistants,
some consultants, and several professional
colleagues.
(3) This set of dimensions was then ap-
plied by the coders to a sample of the ma-
terial to be coded, resulting in the deletion
of some dimensions, the rephrasing of
others, and the addition of a few new di-
mensions.
(4) The author then reappraised the di-
13 Particularly suggestive on the Soviet side
were Leites (1953), Moore (1950), and Meyer
(1957).
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mensions and further tightened up the three
positions within each dimension, in order to
maximize mutual exclusiveness as well as
exhaustiveness of these positions.
(5) The dimensions and their positions
were then pretested by the coders them-
selves to insure that: (a) the literature to
be coded made frequent enough reference
to the dimensions to be worth coding;14
(b) the dimensions themselves did not over-
lap one another (except in a few cases
where some subtle shadings of attitude
were being sought); ( c ) the dimensions
themselves were clear and unambiguous
enough to assure that independent coders
would have a high agreement that a specific
article should or should not be coded along
that dimension (each article was to be
coded only once, if at all, per dimension);
and (d) the three positions within each
dimension were as mutually exclusive as
possible, yet exhaustive of the possible
ranges of relevant response.
( 6 ) When the pretests had demonstrated,
by agreement between two or more inde-
pendent coders, that the dimensions and
positions were adequately refined and clari-
fied, they were settled upon as final.
In the second phase, applying the code
to the materials, we proceeded as follows:
( 1 ) Each of our six periodicals was as-
signed to two separate and independent
coders (Russian-reading coders for Pravda
and Kommunist,) in the following pattern:
New York Times Pravda
1. McLeod 1. Slobin
2. Samuels 2. Proffer
Department of State
Bulletin Kommunist
1. Jellison 1. Slobin
2. Samuels 2. Proffer
Foreign Affairs International Affairs
1. Samuels 1. McLeod
2. Cohl 2. Samuels
(2) The coders-three of whom had al-
ready been engaged in pretesting the pre-
liminary dimensions and positions-received
their final revised instructions, the pertinent
parts of which are given in Appendices A
and B (p. 477).
Though the standard content-analysis
techniques were used and they worked
relatively well in all but a few cases,15 it
must be emphasized that the method does
require an inferential reasoning process and
that no two coders will in all cases infer,
from the same statement, the same conclu-
sion. The degree of intercoder agreement
was, however, as high as might be ex-
pected, as the following section indicates.
STATISTICAL RELIABILITY
AND INTERCODER AGREEMENT16
In any social science research that em-
ploys quantitative measures and indices,
one is obligated to indicate how reliable the
measures and indices turned out to be. Our
concern in this particular study is with the
reliability of our dimensions and the posi-
14In some instances, dimensions that pro-
duced relatively sparse pretest results were re-
tained because of their seeming importance,
and on the hope that the full population would
produce a larger N. Furthermore, to have
excluded low N items would have deprived us
of the range and contrast necessary to a useful
measure of salience. Finally we were con-
fronted by the fact that certain dimensions
might be of high salience for one nation but
not for the other.
15The only real difficulties were in coding
the Department of State Bulletin; these oc-
curred on items A-1, A-2, C-1, C-3, and D-9.
In these five cases, the wide discrepancies be-
tween the two coders were resolved by a
conference in which the principal investigator
was able to discover the sources of "error" and
have them recoded.
16 For the application of the technique used
here and for the calculations themselves, the
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tions within each of the dimensions, in
terms of the agreement between the two
independent coders who worked on each
of our six periodicals.
The technique employed here is one that
has been especially devised for precisely
this type of study and is described fully
in Scott (1955). It differs from the more
conventional methods, not only in that it
takes partial account of the frequency of
agreement to &dquo;no code&dquo; an article in a
given dimension, but that it avoids the bias
that favors those dimensions in which most
or all of the coding is in only one or two
of the positions. If we were to count, in the
reliability of a certain dimension, only those
435
articles that have been coded by at least
one of the coders, we would be biasing the
index in favor of the frequently coded
dimensions. On the other hand, if we
counted all articles (including those not
coded) in the reliability index of a dimen-
sion without allowing for the distribution
of codes among the positions, we would be
biasing the index in favor of the least fre-
quently coded dimensions. Another impli-
cation is that the conventional indices de-
stroy the comparability between and among
publications when there is a sharp disparity
in the frequency with which each may be
coded.
The Index of Intercoder Agreement (IA)
used here represents the ratio of the actual
difference between the obtained agreement
and chance agreement to the maximum dif-
ference between obtained and chance
agreement, and is comparable to the con-
ventional &dquo;percentage agreement&dquo; indices
in that it varies from 0.0 to 1.0.
1. Expected percent agreement (P,) is
calculated as follows:
2. Observed percent agreement ( Po ) is
calculated as follows:
3. Having calculated Pg and P,, the IA is
computed by this formula:
4. Then, in order to get the statistical
significance of our IA for each periodical,
or the critical ratio (CR), we use the fol-
lowing formula:
5. The CR is checked for its probability
by comparing it to the normal curve tables
of any statistics text; we assume a one-tailed
test inasmuch as the direction is predicted.
Having noted the special advantages of
this technique, however, we recognize that
it still has its shortcomings, and might con-
ceivably be replaced by some of the newer
techniques in any subsequent study of this
sort. Among those that have been sug-
gested are Cohen (1960) and Gamer and
Hade (1951).
Tables 1 and 2 show Po, P,, IA, and sig-
nificance (Sig. column) for the three peri-
odicals on each side, for all 35 dimensions
( Dim. column). In the Sig. column, three
asterisks (***) represent a probability (of
chance agreement) of less than 0.001, two
(**) represent a probability between 0.01
and 0.001, and one (*) represents a prob-
ability between 0.05 and 0.01. Probabilities
higher than 0.05 are shown at the signifi-
cance level indicated (0.09, etc.). In cer-
tain cases, the observed agreement was
lower than the expected agreement. These
dimensions are designated by &dquo;Neg.&dquo; in
the IA column and by a dash (-) in the
Sig. column.
Findings of the Study: USSR
Turning from the problems of method
and procedure to the substantive findings,
let us first describe and discuss the data
that emerge from the Soviet and American
sides of the study, in this and the following
section. In the last section we attempt
some comparisons and conclusions. It will
be recalled that the foreign policy attitude
dimensions were divided into four main sets
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of issues, and we will examine our results
in that particular sequence.
In the tables for the 35 dimensions on
the Soviet side, the first three columns are
journal columns; P stands for Pravda, K
for Kommunist, I for International A f f airs.
The figures shown under these three heads
and in the three position rows (a, b, c) are
percentage distributions for each journal.
The fourth column, headed C (combined),
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shows the mean percentage distribution of
the three journals for each position. The
figures in the Salience row are the number
(not, as in Angell’s study, the percentage)
of times that the total dimension itself was
mentioned in each of the three journals,
with total N shown under the C column.
All figures represent the mean between the
two independent coders. At the end of the
study are eight summary tables, showing
each coder’s-as well as combined-results
for all four sets of foreign policy issues on
both sides.
A. SOVIET ELITE IMAGE OF THEIR
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
A-1. This first dimension is intended to
produce the articulated image of the natu-
ral and normal character of the international
political system. The three possible posi-
tions and percentage distributions were:
These figures illustrate, at the very out-
set, a sharp disagreement between tradi-
tional Bolshevik doctrine and the contem-
porary Party line as articulated in the So-
viet media. Whereas the dominant theme
in Marx, Lenin, and Stalin is one of con-
tinuing and unremitting conflict until the
victory of Communism has been achieved,
our analysis reveals that a much more im-
mediate interpretation appears in the cur-
rent era. Thus, instead of adhering to the
doctrine of the three struggles (capitalists
vs. colonies, capitalists vs. capitalists in their
struggle for colonies, and finally capitalists
vs. &dquo;socialists&dquo;), we find the elites of 1957-
60 arguing that the international system is
not one of continuing conflict, but rather
one whose natural harmony is upset by the
temporary aggressors of the moment i.e.,
the Western camp led by the United States.
In not one of the three periodicals did our
coders find any reference to pervasive con-
flict inherent in the system; they did find,
however, that 75 percent of the references to
the international system implied that were
it not for the American-led aggressors, the
system would be peaceful. This line was
particularly evident in Pravda, whose read-
ership is, of course, the broadest of the
three and which is the only mass-circulation
journal studied; here 100 percent of the
codes were on position b. In Kommunist,
the Party’s theoretical journal, position b
dropped somewhat to 75 percent, and posi-
tion a scored 25 percent, suggesting that at
least the belief in the normal conflict be-
tween nations of differing ideologies and
social systems remains. And in the more
specialized journal, International Affairs,
the distribution moves further still from
the line of the moment toward the more
traditional one, by dropping to 55 percent
for the deviant aggressor theme and going
up to 45 percent for the ideological and so-
cial system explanation.
A-2. The second dimension seeks to
ascertain the Soviet foreign policy elite’s
interpretation of the present international
struggle. The three possible interpretations
and responses were that it is between:
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These figures indicate that the Soviet
elite perceives its struggle with the United
States and its allies as spilling over into all
three positions. While the emphasis on
competition between social systems might
be expected, it is interesting that there is
a considerably heavier emphasis on posi-
tion c (centers of power) than on position
a (belief systems). This not only deviates
from our stereotyped notion of Soviet atti-
tudes, but may hold some small promise of
peaceful resolution of the current conflict,
as it is considerably easier for a protagonist
to compromise in a power struggle than in
an ideological struggle.
A-3. Dimension 3 asks where this par-
ticular elite tends to find the causes of war.
The possible responses and results are
shown below.
These figures are less surprising in the
light of the dimension 1 results than they
might otherwise have been. Again, the doc-
trinaire image of a world in continuing and
regular struggle is replaced by the more
typical national view of any state engaged in
this sort of conflict; it is not the system and
its normal clashes but the aggressiveness of
&dquo;the enemy&dquo; that threatens war. Also some-
what encouraging in our results is the par-
tial awareness of accident and miscalcula-
tion as the cause of war. Though there
were no references to this variable in the
theoretical journal ( Kommunist ) , 15 per-
cent of the references in International Af-
fairs and 14 percent of those in Pravda were
to accident or miscalculation.
A-4. Once recognizing that the present
protagonists do have rather different social
and political systems, what does the Soviet
foreign policy elite see as the possible results
of such a relationship? The possible alterna-
tives and responses are shown.
Here, of course, is the nub of the &dquo;co-
existence&dquo; dilemma for both the US and the
USSR. During the 1957-60 period under
study, the coexistence line was dominant,
and as a result we found almost no refer-
ences to inevitable military clash (and then
only in Kammunist, written by and for the
theoreticians). Kommunist was also the
most conflict-oriented of the three periodi-
cals. It was the only one producing a
higher number of references to the eco-
nomic and political competition theme (81
percent) than to the cooperation theme
(15 percent). Pravda and Internatioyeal Af-
fairs, on the other hand, were closer to the
line of the moment, showing a more or less
equal concern with both aspects of the re-
lationship, indicating that they believe that
cooperation and competition are not neces-
sarily incompatible in a given bilateral re-
lationship.
A-5. In dimensions 5 and 6 we seek
some clues as to the more general philo-
sophical attitudes that the Soviets have re-
garding international relations: the prob-
lem of prediction and the problem of
inevitability. Dimension 5, dealing with
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their views on the predictability of interna-
tional events, offered the alternative posi-
tions and percentage responses shown below.
At first glance it would seem that the
Soviet elite believes that the course of
events in international relations is rather
predictable, but the results can be given
little credence because of the very low
number of references or allusions to this
question. As indicated in the Salience row,
our sample produced a total of only 26
such references over the three-year period,
suggesting that such abstract and theoreti-
cal concerns receive little attention in their
media.
A-6. In dimension 6, we move from the
predictability question to that of inevita-
bility, posing three alternative responses to
the statement &dquo;In international relations we
are...&dquo; :
This time we find a higher number of
references, especially in International Af-
f airs, and the results suggest that the elite
take a fairly pragmatic view, emphasizing
that they could, within certain acknowl-
edged (but usually undefined) limits, in-
fluence the course of events. Again, the
salience is low enough to suggest that the
traditional and formal ideological assertions
play a diminishingly intrusive role in Soviet
images of the world.
A-7. Dimension 7 offers a general and
preliminary clue as to where they stand on
the more specific aspects of the contem-
porary power balance. In regard to this
distribution of power, the possible catego-
ries and the responses are shown below.
These results are, of course, highly pre-
dictable and highlight a key point not only
in Soviet external propaganda, but in that
aimed at the domestic audience as well.
But it ought not be assumed that this is
solely a position designed for public con-
sumption ; the tone of confidence exuded
coincides with the oft-quoted Khrushchev
dictum that &dquo;we will bury you.&dquo;17 Note
that reference is not to the military or any
other specific variable in the power equa-
tion but to an across-the-board evaluation.
As to the implications, one may only guess,
since very little is known about the impact
of perceived power on state behavior. One
may just as readily hypothesize that such
confidence will lead to more aggressive and
belligerent behavior as that it will produce
a more tolerant and less fearful posture be-
cause the earlier (articulated) insecurity
has diminished so dramatically.
17 Since this phrase is generally misunder-
stood in the West to imply the active notion
of destruction, it should be noted that it can
have a more passive connotation in the Rus-
sian idiom, merely indicating a belief that they
will outlast the West and hence be present in
all their vigor at the funeral. It should also be
noted that it was not until 1961 that the West’s
nuclear-missile superiority became evident.
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A-8. In this dimension, we seek another
clue as to the Soviet foreign policy elite’s
view of the contemporary international
scene. Here we look for their attitude on
the implications of limited war and what
its outcome might be.
These percentages tend to support those
in the United States who favor emphasis
on retaining a powerful retaliatory force;
the Soviet fear of escalation (most sharply
reflected in the specialists’ journal, Inter-
national Affairs) reveals both the perceived
capability and credibility of the nuclear
threat. The lack of a single reference to the
probability of a limited war remaining
limited may, however, suggest that it is part
of their effort to push the peaceful coexis-
tence line and to demonstrate that those
&dquo;Western imperialists&dquo; who are giving seri-
ous consideration to limited war are really
advocating general nuclear war, but in
stages. It would be most useful to check
this dimension out in Military Thought,
Military Herald, and other of the more pro-
fessional journals, since its salience for the
nonmilitary elites is clearly small.
B. SOVIET ELITE EVALUATION
OF THE POWER BALANCE
In this issue we turn from the more gen-
eral images or attitudes about the interna-
tional political system of the current era to
some of the more specific variables reflect-
ing Soviet appraisals of the relative power
of themselves and the Western coalition.
As suggested above (dimension A-7) the
implications of their views on relative power
are not at all clear and obvious.
B-1. In the first four dimensions in this
set, reference is to power variables of an
essentially military nature. The first dimen-
sion deals with the crucial question of how
vulnerable they believe their retaliatory
capability to be.
Thus the few allusions we did find em-
phasize the relative invulnerability of their
retaliatory capability; we found not a single
reference in position a (highly vulnerable).
As in many of the other dimensions, this
is probably a function of both a propaganda
effort and a well-founded belief.18 Even
before their ICBM became operational,
they seemed to evince such confidence, and
in materials other than those coded in this
study such confidence is reiterated. If they
believe in this relative invulnerability
(based on concealment and hardening as
well as numbers) they should be a more
18An indication of the rapidity with which
technological relations&mdash;and hence political re-
lations&mdash;change in this era is the essential ob-
solescence of the comments on dimensions 1
through 4. In the years between the period
analyzed and the present writing, the missile
advantage has clearly shifted and the vulnera-
bility of the American missile forces has been
dramatically reduced. However, the Soviet
elite still seems to believe that their "minimum
deterrent" can ride out a counter-force strike
and retaliate with a counter-city blow of pro-
portions unacceptable to North America.
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predictable and conservative partner in this
delicate game of mutual deterrence. The
more convinced they are that they can ride
out and absorb a first strike, the less likely
they are to fear surprise attack or to con-
sider a preemptive strike necessary. And if
they believe that the Western capability is
essentially a counter-city or counter-econ-
omy one (as opposed to a counter-force
capability), they should be even less in-
clined to expect us to opt for surprise; this
self-limited capability reduces our ability to
eliminate the chance of reprisal, and thus
reduces our incentive to strike first. The
trouble in this equation is that until we
have diminished our own vulnerability,
their capability is as much counter-force as
it is counter-city.
B-2. The second dimension is designed
to indicate the elite’s perception of their
own deterrent capability and offers three
views.
In coding, we found no references to
any of these capabilities in Pravda and
Kommunist, but in International Affairs
100 percent of the references fell into po-
sition c, evincing belief in their overall de-
terrent capability. They certainly want
everyone at home and abroad to believe
that this capability exists, but if the elite
does in fact believe it too, then we can
view it as a rather hopeful sign. That is,
such a belief suggests that they (1) are
pursuing a strategy of deterrence and (2)
feel no need to strike first.
B-3. Turning to the hardware component
of their articulated capability, we seek to
ascertain the Soviet elite’s evaluation of their
progress in weapon production and tech-
nology vis-~-vis the West. The responses
are shown below.
This easily anticipated result reflects (or
did reflect), again, a dual situation of
reasonably well-founded confidence and an
effort to convey that confidence to several
audiences. As in dimension A-7, it reveals
not only an assurance regarding the present
power balance but, more significantly, an
assurance regarding trends into the near
future. If they believe that in military tech-
nology and production, as well as in the
more general indices of power, they are
forging ahead, they may become less inter-
ested in any sort of military engagement,
seeing eventual political victory as theirs
without armed conflict. On the other hand,
such confidence could just as easily lead
them toward increasingly bellicose or over-
bearing behavior that would provoke us
into a similar posture. It is also possible
that, if both sides perceive a power trend
as going in the same direction, the poten-
tially disadvantaged one may be impelled
to strike before the anticipated edge be-
comes decisive.
B-4. Much the same results appear in
dimension 4, dealing with the Soviet elite’s
appraisal of the current military balance.
During the period studied, our periodicals
revealed this percentage distribution:
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The interpretations of dimensions B-1,
B-2, B-3, and A-7 are equally applicable
here.
B-5. Turning to a somewhat different
index of the Soviet foreign policy elite’s
evaluation of their relative power, we seek
statements regarding the basis and motiva-
tion of their alliances.
These results, too, suggest an effort to
convey a sense of strength and confidence;
this is particularly evidenced by the absence
of any allusion to their oum national need
for the alliance. Rather they emphasized
the social, political, and ideological solidar-
ity of the Communist coalition, with only
a minor emphasis on the negative and de-
fensive characteristics of the alliances (see
Brzezinski, 1960, and Modelski, 1960).
B-6. Shifting from dimensions that focus
either on their own strength or on relative
power, we turn to four items that indicate
the Soviet elite’s appraisal of American
strengths and weaknesses. The first deals
with their evaluation of American foreign
policy planning and strategic decision-mak-
ing.
While the mass circulation paper’s articles
on foreign affairs were found to have not a
single reference to the qualities of the Amer-
ican decision process, the item appeared
with some frequency in Kommunist, and
with greater frequency in International Af-
fairs. Whereas there is a strong tendency
in the West to exaggerate the efficacy and
thoroughness of Soviet planning, and to
look upon Kremlin policy as the adroit pur-
suit of prearranged and subjectively inevi-
table goals, the Soviet elite give American
and Western planning no such credit. To
the contrary, they make only infrequent
references to its being a combination of
plan and improvisation (which is what all
national policies must be), and most often
describe it as haphazard, responding pri-
marily to events over which we have no
control. This narrow an empirical base does
not provide justification for any broader
generalizations, but if the attitudes reflected
here are any clue to their general image of
our strategic decision processes, it may
make them more wary of any alleged sta-
bility in the balance of terror, when such
stability is a function not only of weapon
systems but of the command and decision
processes that restrain or unleash such sys-
tems. Whether their low estimate of the
rationality of American planning is advan-
tageous or not is, however, another matter,
as a reputation for recklessness may pro-
duce not only concessions, but perhaps re-
ciprocal recklessness as well.
B-7. In addition to the Soviet image of
the quality of American planning, we were
interested in their notion of which groups
dominate the policy-making process.
Here is a classic case of the relevance of
orthodox Marxism to the Soviet image of
&dquo;capitalist&dquo; societies; 78 percent of the time
they assigned dominance to the economic
and technological elites (primarily the
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former, but we used the combination be-
cause of its applicability to the American
image of Soviet policy). In Pravda, neither
coder found a single article assigning this
dominance to the political leadership, and
only one such was found in Kommunist.
Again, International Affairs demonstrates
the least adherence to official dogma and a
greater sophistication than the other two,
but it, too, seems to misunderstand the
American political system. The assignments
of dominance were as follows:
B-8. Regarding the relationship of the
American armament program to the econ-
omy as a whole, we offered these three
alternatives:
Again, the influence of the formal and
official ideology is very evident, with 80
percent of the references alleging that, in
one way or another, the American economy
is highly dependent upon preparedness ex-
penditures. This result jibes, of course, with
the results on dimension 7, where economic
elites are seen as dominating American
policy. The connection is clear: they are
the ones who profit from preparedness ex-
penditures. Another interesting point raised
by this dimension is that during early 1959
Khrushchev began to articulate with some
frequency a rather deviant position in order
to make his disarmament proposals more
attractive: the arms race is not only not
advantageous to the American economy,
but represents a considerable drain upon it.
Throughout this new phase, however, the
Soviet press continued to argue that &dquo;Wall
Street,&dquo; etc., would stand in the way of
arms elimination, tension reduction, or polit-
ical settlement because of the belie f that
profits would disappear or the economy
would collapse without the arms race.
B-9. As to the various vulnerabilities of
the United States, this dimension seeks a
description of the way in which the Ameri-
can sociopolitical system would meet its al-
legedly inevitable demise. Responses on the
three possible factors leading to this col-
lapse are shown below.
The expressed faith in the inevitability
of American collapse is best indicated by
the nearly total absence of references to
their own forcible measures, and most of
those references were in the context of an
American-initiated war. There was a fairly
equal emphasis on their own ideological
and political successes elsewhere and the
inherent weaknesses and contradictions
within the United States itself. Here, of
course, is a dominant strain in the coexis-
tence theme and a crucial one for meeting
neo-Stalinist criticism within the Commu-
nist world: war or other overtly aggressive
action is not even necessary.
B-10. The final dimension utilized in
trying to identify the Soviet elite’s appraisal
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of the relative power balance concerns the
implications of a general nuclear war. The
possible outcomes that they could have pre-
dicted are shown below.
Such results indicate the inevitable am-
bivalence that any national elite must face
in coping with the nuclear war problem.
On the one hand, there is the objective
awareness of the irrelevance of &dquo;victory&dquo; in
such a war; in the same vein, they need to
stress the tremendous propaganda for peace-
ful coexistence and disarmament. On the
other hand, they cannot afford to go all the
way in this direction for fear of giving the
impression of a nation so paralyzed with
the apprehensions of war that they might
not even fight in a showdown. Thus, the
37 percent score on the &dquo;victory for us&dquo; and
the 10 percent score on &dquo;greater destruction
to the US&dquo; are an index of their reliance on
deterrence (requiring credible threats of re-
taliation), while the somewhat higher 53
percent score on the mutual devastation po-
sition may reflect a combination of genuine
concern and political propaganda.
C. SOVIET ELITE IMAGE OF AMERICAN
OPERATIONAL CODE
Turning from the Soviet foreign policy
elite’s image of American and Western power
vis-a-vis themselves, we look at their image
of our goals and general international strat-
egy. If it is true that a major variable in the
behavior of a nation is its expectations re-
garding the behavior of others, the results of
this part should be particularly useful.
C-1. In the first dimension we pose a
question to our unseen and unsuspecting
respondents concerning their belief as to
what constitutes the major and dominant
goal of American foreign policy. The posi-
tions and responses were:
This particular dimension was inserted in
the hope that we might find some sophisti-
cated differentiations, on the part of each
side’s elite, between policies of domination or
expansion and mere self-preservation, but the
hopes were unjustified. First of all, no na-
tion involved in a struggle such as that be-
tween the Soviets and ourselves can be ex-
pected to give official credence to the
other’s protestations of self-preservation; to
accept the legitimacy of such a claim would
be to suggest one’s own aggressiveness. Nor
can official spokesmen be expected to real-
ize (or articulate) that much of the adver-
sary’s bellicosity is a function of the an-
archic international system rather than their
dreams of conquest. Moreover, our coders
experienced considerable difficulty in dif-
ferentiating between statements attributing
position a (world domination) to the United
States and those attributing position b (re-
taining and expanding sphere of influence)
to us. The only conclusion emerging from
this dimension is that the Soviet elite say
that they think the United States is partic-
ularly aggressive and belligerent.
C-2. In this dimension we sought to
identify the relative influence that the So-
viet elite attributes to the roles of physical
security and formal ideology in American
policy-making when (and if) the two con-
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siderations came into conflict. The alterna-
tive responses are shown.
The results, however, are completely in-
significant within the response context. We
found only one reference to this conflict
between security and ideology in Pravda,
none in Kommunist, and one in Interna-
t ional Affairs over our three-year sample.
Had there been more responses one might
have concluded that, as far as the Soviet
elite is concerned, there is no clash or dis-
continuity between ideology and security
for the American elite. However, this
would not tell us whether they believe that
American imperialistic ideology is in such a
position of mastery that there is no question
of conflict between the two sets of de-
mands, or whether they believe that the
two sets of demands are just thoroughly
compatible. Results on other dimensions
suggest that the latter interpretation is more
reasonable.
C-3. Here we attempt to ferret out what
the Soviet elite considers to be the major
instrument of American foreign policy. Ac-
cording to the Soviet articulations, the
United States comes out on this continuum
as shown in the table below.
The results indicate that they see primary
reliance on military force in American
policy, with a nevertheless substantial em-
phasis on subversion and penetration. This
suggests that the Soviets may not think that
the United States is willing to engage them
in the less violent areas of competitive co-
existence, but insists on pursuing the strug-
gle primarily in military terms. If this is
true, it may lead to increased Soviet con-
fidence and aggressiveness in the nonmili-
tary realms, and require us in turn to pick
up that challenge or to be left behind.
One point should be made concerning
dimensions C-1 through C-3: they were
designed primarily for the American part of
the study and are to a great extent a func-
tion of American hypotheses about Soviet
foreign policy peculiarities. They therefore
may be less relevant for this part of the
study.
C-4. In this dimension, our concern is to
identify that aspect of Western behavior
which most convinced the Soviets of hostile
intent on the part of the United States and
its allies. The various positions complete
the statement &dquo;Their aggressive intentions
are revealed by....&dquo;
The hope here was that we might get at
least a gross clue as to what was particu-
larly provocative from the Soviet point of
view, and the results do show very little
concern (8 percent) over American pre-
paredness per se. They profess much more
alarm over our alliances (54 percent) and
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overseas bases (38 percent); in all three
periodicals the emphasis is on alliances (52,
62, 53 percent) more than on overseas
bases (48, 38, 29 percent). Though the
gap is not dramatic, it poses an interesting
question: alliances by themselves cannot
pose a direct and tangible threat to them,
but bases surely can. Is it possible that they
are more worried over the fact that other
nations are involved in anti-Soviet prepara-
tions than over the overt presence of weap-
ons on their periphery? It is also note-
worthy that our coders found a higher total
of references to this item than to any other
in group C. Finally, it should be noted
that the bulk of the study covers the period
prior to the installation of the soft and vul-
nerable IRBM sites in Britain, Italy, and
Turkey; our hypothesis would be that in a
continuing analysis, the bases would take
on greater salience than the alliances that
paved the way for them.
C-5. In this dimension (retained primar-
ily because of its value in the American
side of the study) we search for some indi-
cations as to the Soviet elite’s image of
American strategic doctrine. As in the pre-
test, there were very few references to this
trichotomization, but the distribution is
shown below.
Most of the pertinent references were in
International Affairs, and if they indicate
anything, it is that neither protagonist can
afford to admit publicly that the other’s
strategy is purely or primarily a retaliatory
one. It also suggests that the &dquo;subtle&dquo; dis-
tinctions are not considered relevant for
public discussion and that the adversary’s
strategy tends to be described in gross, neg-
ative, and hostile terms.
C-6. As to the Soviet elite’s image of
American motivation for space research and
production, there were somewhat overlap-
ping possibilities, as shown.
But the number of references were so
few as to make these results not particularly
significant. Again, whether the periodical
is of a mass- or an elite-audience nature, it
is seldom likely to inquire into the subtleties
of the adversary’s motivations.
C-7. The final dimension in the Soviet
evaluation of the American operational code
concerns our motivation in giving economic
assistance to the underdeveloped nations.
The positions shown are the possible expla-
nations.
The results could hardly be more con-
clusive ; the Soviet elite seems to believe
that there is no altruism in American aid
and that it is not even designed to preserve
the neutrality of the recipient peoples. Our
motivation is seen as being solely within
the Cold War context, with heavy empha-
sis on alliance-building.
447
D. SOVIET EXPRESSIONS OF OWN
OPERATIONAL CODE
Having examined, by analysis of a sample
of their press, Soviet images of the interna-
tional system, the power balance, and the
American operational code, we now turn to
the fourth and last issue on the Soviet side
of the study-expressions of their own op-
erational code.
D-1. The first dimension in this issue
deals with certain of the criteria by which
policy decisions ought to be made. The
positions consist of three completions of
the phrase &dquo;Foreign policy should be based
&dquo;
on....
First of all, there is no public recognition
of the need to consider neutral evaluation
of their policy; no coder found a single ref-
erence to position b. On the other hand,
considerable emphasis (73 percent) was
placed upon the need to adhere to moral
principles, and the combined score on a
pure self-interest approach was a low 27
percent. However, a genuine problem of
interpretation arises here; when the Soviets
refer to moral principles, the evidence is
that they have in mind the official and for-
mal ideology as derived from Marx, Lenin,
and Stalin. Thus one must be careful to dis-
tinguish between the Soviet and Western
notions of morality; they differ considerably
in content, though probably not in their
normative applicability as articulated by the
respective elites.
D-2. A key to their bargaining strategy
is sought by posing the statement &dquo;Success-
ful negotiations are most likely to occur
when....&dquo;
In line with the normal attitude of one
protagonist in any competition, the Soviets
indicate (with a combined score of 66 per-
cent) that they believe that any superiority
they enjoy in a bargaining situation would
not be exploited by themselves, but that if
they were on the short end, the other side
would try to exploit it, making successful
negotiation impossible. (Note the zero
score in position b. ) Here is the crux of the
&dquo;posture of strength&dquo; dilemma; neither side
wants to negotiate if weaker, and since an
accurate appraisal is hard to make, a situa-
tion of parity would seldom appear as such,
but rather as one of disadvantageous im-
balance to each. Thus, each will try
to achieve a preponderance prior to serious
negotiation, but is unlikely to be successful
in any broad-scale, long-run sense of the
word. If one side is successful, they will-
despite the oft-articulated belief to the con-
trary-seek to exploit the edge; and if they
do not do so, fear that they will makes the
weaker side most unwilling to negotiate.
Relevant here is the old diplomatic dictum
that if you’re stronger, you don’t have to
negotiate, and if you’re weaker, you don’t
dare to. The one encouraging sign in these
results, however, is the 34 percent fre-
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quency of position c (negotiation based on
approximate parity). As a matter of fact,
the coders of Pravda and Kommunist found
that 67 percent of their responses fell into
this position, but subsequent investigation
suggests that they inferred this position
from mere rejections of position b. Such an
inference is plausible, but hardly inevita-
ble.i9
D-3. In the same vein, we asked our
unknowing respondents to indicate &dquo;Peace
can best be maintained by....&dquo;
If these articulations are reliable indices
of elite conviction, they offer some mixed
encouragement. Though 18 percent of the
responses reflected the traditional national
belief in &dquo;peace through strength,&dquo; the bulk
(67 percent) were in the major power co-
operation position. This is, in all proba-
bility, partly a function of sincere belief.
However naive the proposition that major
powers in a conflict relationship can cooper-
ate for peace, its support by the Soviet
foreign policy elite may be an augury of
serious intent. The disappointing score in
the effective international organization po-
sition (15 percent) does not, however, look
particularly promising to the student of in-
ternational politics whose faith in peace
through strength and peace through cooper-
ation has been shattered by their numerous
failures throughout the history of the na-
tion-state system.
D-4. Here we had hoped to get some
clues as to Soviet and American thinking
on limited war, and despite the low salience
of this dimension in our pretests in the
Soviet literature, we included it for its value
on the American side. The frequency of
its appearance in the Soviet sector of the
study was so low as not to warrant report-
ing. For the record, the possible responses
to &dquo;Resort to limited war is ...&dquo; are given
below.
Here again is one of those cases where
the coding of more specialized military
journals might be productive.
D-5. In the next two dimensions we
search for, and find, some indications of
Soviet strategy vis-a-vis arms reduction and
elimination. The first dimension concerns
the political settlement-disarmament se-
quence.
Thus there is little (3 percent) accept-
ance of the conventional Western doctrine
that, because political disputes preceded
the arms race, they must therefore be re-
19 Suggestive here are Dennett and Johnson
(1951) and Jensen (1962).
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solved before the arms can be eliminated.
And only 7 percent of the time did they
even call for simultaneous handling of arms
and political disputes. In the bulk of the
cases (90 percent) the &dquo;need not precede&dquo;
position was taken, suggesting a belief that
immediate efforts in the disarmament field
might be fruitfully undertaken, despite the
existence of outstanding political disputes
or high levels of bilateral tension. If this
does represent their beliefs accurately, and
is not merely part of the propaganda bar-
rage, it helps at least one of the problems in
the arms control-reduction-elimination field:
the feeling that a multitude of other prob-
lems need not (and perhaps cannot) be
dealt with first (see Singer, 1958).
D-6. Another, and perhaps more critical,
aspect of Soviet elite thinking on the arma-
ment problem concerns the matter of in-
spection and controls. Again, the possible
positions involve chronological priorities.
The Soviet foreign policy elite articulates
a conviction that there must be no controls
without arms reduction, scoring zero for
controls preceding reductions, and that con-
trols must either follow (29 percent) or ac-
company (71 percent) arms reductions.
This latter distinction and the respective
scores are significant; despite Western con-
tentions that the Soviets propose that we
begin (or even conclude) a disarmament
process prior to the installation of a control,
inspection, or enforcement scheme, there is
little evidence of that position here. How-
ever, there is still the unresolved question of
what the Soviets regard as adequate or ef-
fective controls, and this has been one (but
only one) of the major obstacles in the
negotiations to date (see Nogee, 1961).
D-7. Next we turn to their position on
political decision-making in the United
Nations or any other present or future inter-
national organization. Designed before
their 1960 General Assembly attacks on the
United Nations structure, the dimension
asked what the decisions of international
organizations should be based on.
Though Pravda and Kommunist, tended
to insist on the traditional doctrine of great-
power unanimity and its corollary, the veto,
the more sophisticated International Affairs
( which, it must be remembered, is published
and distributed in several languages) ac-
cepted (38 percent) the need for &dquo;general
approval of other members.&dquo; This journal,
again in contrast to the two home-consump-
tion ones, also partially accepted (38 per-
cent) the doctrine of majority rule. (Ger-
mane here are Dallin, 1962; Goodman,
1960; Jacobson, 1964; and Rubinstein,
1960. )
D-8. Our next dimension concerns the
Soviet elite’s position on &dquo;the various disen-
gagement proposals&dquo; for central Europe,
and though this item was inserted primarily
for the American side of the study, it is not
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irrelevant here. The reactions to such pro-
posals are shown below.
Having played an instrumental role-or
at least an encouraging one-in the initia-
tion of these various plans, beginning with
that of Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki, the
Soviets could hardly have taken a position
other than that outlined in position c.
D-9. The last two dimensions are in the
realm of international economic relations,
with this one articulating Soviet motives for
engaging in foreign aid programs.
If we recall that these are the same posi-
tions as utilized in group C ( Other’s Opera-
tional Code), some interesting results
emerge. While all three of their periodicals
attributed only the &dquo;Cold War&dquo; motivation
to American foreign aid programs, they see
their own motivations in a drastically dif-
ferent light. In Pravda and Kommunist,
their motives were seen as solely altruistic
in 67 percent and 50 percent of the cases,
respectively, and in International A f f airs it
was 40 percent, for a combined self-congrat-
ulatory score of 55 percent. In addition, the
&dquo;help them remain independent&dquo; (of West-
ern imperialism) theme was expressed 40
percent of the time. Only 5 percent of the
references were to self-interest and these
were all in Pravda; apparently the policy-
makers have no Congressional appropria-
tions committees to contend with in the
USSR.
D-10. In this dimension we seek some
indication as to their position on the free
international trade question. The available
responses were of the open-ended type.
Undoubtedly, the Soviets would like to
see an international trade picture in which
they had easier access to certain now-pro-
scribed raw materials and manufactured
goods, and they might even be willing to
permit greater import and export freedom
across their boundaries. But as proponents
par excellence of the political use of eco-
nomic instruments and believers in the
mobilization of all resources for the en-
hancement of national power, they could
hardly be expected to accept a trade ar-
rangement with all other nations in which
they would be required to accept many im-
ports and in which their exports would have
to compete on an open world market. Any
modification of trade barriers would have to
be politically, rather than just economically,
advantageous for the USSR to accept it. It
should be pointed out, though, that this is
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another of the dimensions whose relevance
was seen primarily in the American rather
than in the Soviet context, and it will be
examined further in the next section of the
study.
Findings of the Study: United States
One of the major assumptions underlying
this study is that a truer perspective on the
object under scrutiny can be obtained by
comparing that object with another of ap-
proximately similar attributes. Thus we feel
that, in examining Soviet foreign policy ar-
ticulations, our understanding of them will
be improved if they can be set alongside
American articulations regarding the same
policy dimensions. But there is another and
perhaps even more compelling reason for
examining these characteristics on the
American as well as the Soviet side-the
fact that both powers are engaged, one with
the other, in a conflict relationship that is
often just a short distance from the preci-
pice of strategic nuclear war. And central
to our approach is the assumption that an
unintended war (as distinguished from a
carefully predetermined aggressive strike)
can be made less likely as each side be-
comes more accurate in predicting the be-
havior of the other.20 The purpose of this
study is to enhance, to the extent permitted
by our method and data, the ability of each
to make such predictions, despite the ad-
mitted disadvantages. Let us turn, there-
fore, in this section to the results of our
coding of the New York Times (T in the
tables), Department of State Bulletin ( B ) ,
and Foreign Affairs (F). The same se-
quence as employed in the preceding sec-
tion will be followed.
A. AMERICAN ELITE IMAGE OF THEIR
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
A-1. The first dimension in group A is
intended to tell us something regarding the
way in which the American foreign policy
elite perceives the natural, normal, endur-
ing character of international politics. The
alternatives and results were as follows:
Just as on the Soviet side, we find mark-
edly little evidence that the system is viewed
as basically conflictful; each elite tends to
imply that harmony could be the natural
order. But whereas the Soviets tended to
see conflict more as a function of the peri-
odic aggressor or &dquo;imperialist,&dquo; the Ameri-
cans tended to see it in terms of differing
ideologies or social systems. This in itself
is a reversal of what might have been
expected, since in the United States we
tend to emphasize the degree to which the
Soviets themselves are ideological in their
outlook. Several qualifications are, how-
ever, in order. First, in neither sample did
we find much reference to the general and
enduring international system; consequently
20 This is not to suggest that there are no
disadvantages in such predictability. For ex-
ample, a successful bluff can often produce
substantial political concessions, but such suc-
cess diminishes in probability as mutually ac-
curate predictions increase. Some might con-
tend that the ideal situation is one in which
"we" can anticipate all of their behavior with
a high degree of certainty, while "they" are
good at predicting only certain limited aspects
of ours.
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the coders were often extrapolating from an
articulated view of the contemporary sys-
tem to the more general one. Second, the
percentage differences, while pronounced,
are not profound; the Soviets emphasized
the deviant aggressor theme vis-A-vis the
continuing ideological conflict theme by 75
to 25, while the American ratio in the op-
posite direction was 58 to 35 (with 7 as
opposed to the Soviet zero for a conflict-in-
herent-in-the-system view). And as might
be expected, the strongest expression of this
latter, more sophisticated, perception was
found in Foreign Affairs. Among other
things, the results in this dimension partially
bear out the contention made by George
Kennan that Americans fail to appreciate
the degree to which the environment is
habitually a hostile and conflictful one
(Kennan, 1952 and 1954).
A-2. Turning from international politics
in general to the American elite’s percep-
tion of the contemporary system, we seek
their view on the nature of the immediate
struggle between the superpowers. Again
we find an emphasis that would have been
more expected in the USSR.
But this time we discover a dramatic
difference among our sources. Whereas
both the T imes and Foreign Affairs tended
to view the struggle in terms of Realpolitik,
the official Department of State Bulletin
radically reversed this interpretation, plac-
ing its emphasis on the clashes in ideology
66 percent of the time. There are several
possible explanations for this sharp diver-
gence within the American elite. The obvi-
ous one is that of Secretary Dulles’ own
personal image of the Cold War (he held
the post until mid-April 1959, or nearly two-
thirds of the time span under study) and
the powerful emphasis he gave its moral
and ideological aspects. Obviously, his sub-
ordinates would tend to reflect this image
in their statements, as would Mr. Herter in
the months immediately following Dulles’
resignation and death. Another is that
much of the content of the Bulletin con-
sists of speeches, press conferences, and
other efforts to arouse the public and to
&dquo;make the record&dquo;; in this case an empha-
sis on moral righteousness against the infi-
del is preferable to cold-blooded &dquo;power
politics.&dquo; As suggested in the preceding
section, the greater the emphasis on ideo-
logical conflict, the more difficult is suc-
cessful diplomatic negotiation, and it might
be hoped that the State Department itself
has since begun to move toward the posi-
tion articulated by the Times and Foreign
Affairs,.
A-3. Still in search of generalizable per-
ceptions, this dimension asks where the
elites tend to find the causes of war.
Here we see a logical extension of the
images articulated on dimensions 1 and 2,
with the specifics of the Cold War extrapo-
lated to the system in general. And again
we find a noticeable difference between the
Bulletin and our two nonofficial sources,
with the former placing heaviest (88 per-
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cent) emphasis on one state’s aggressive-
ness. What is also interesting in these fig-
ures is the degree of importance attached
to accidental war. As did Kommunist, the
Bulletin seems to discount completely the
notion that wars might begin unintention-
ally. On the other hand, both the Times
and Foreign Affairs authors give this pos-
sibility almost twice as much emphasis (25
and 28 percent) as did Pravda or Interna-
tional Affairs (14 and 15 percent).
A-4. Becoming somewhat more specific,
we next want to know how the American
foreign policy elite perceives the outcome
of a relationship between states whose be-
liefs and sociopolitical structure seem to dif-
fer so sharply.
The similarity between Soviet and Amer-
ican articulations on this score is impressive.
On combined averages, each side scored 53
percent for position b, while there was a
slightly higher American score on inevitable
military clash (7 percent as opposed to 1
percent) and a slightly lower one regarding
cooperative coexistence (40 percent as op-
posed to 46 percent). These differences
may well be explained in terms of the de-
gree to which Soviet media tend to stay
closer to the official position or line of the
moment, and in any event they are remark-
ably slight. A more interesting difference
is the degree to which the Times reverses
the Bulletin. and, to a lesser extent, Foreign
Affairs. The latter two expressed belief in
the cooperative coexistence theme about
one-third of the time (32 and 33 percent)
whereas the former did so nearly two-thirds
of the time (64 percent), which is more
than that of the highest Soviet organ (Inter-
national A f f airs-59 percent).
A-5. These next two dimensions are de-
signed to shed some light on the more philo-
sophical attitudes of the American elite re-
garding international political relations.
Dimension 5, dealing with their views on
predictability, offered these alternatives and
results:
The rather pragmatic view seems to
dominate here, with all three sources tend-
ing to discount the predictability of inter-
national events. The Times, perhaps be-
cause its editorial writers are less aware of
the emerging possibilities in the research
world than are the others, takes a particu-
larly dim view of prediction. It may also be
significant that Foreign Affairs authors,
coming as they often do from the academic
setting, are both less pessimistic and less
optimistic than the others, placing a strong
emphasis (60 percent) on the &dquo;occasionally
possible&dquo; position.
A-6. Moving from the question of pre-
dictability to that of voluntarism and de-
terminism, we posed three possible re-
sponses to the statement &dquo;In international
relations, we are ...&dquo; (see next page).
These scores are, with the exception of
the Bulletin, very similar to those of their
opposite numbers. Occasionally the Times
and Foreign Affairs make the &dquo;f ree-will&dquo;
claim, but for the most part there is a
marked preference for the &dquo;limited by reali-
ties&dquo; view. Whereas only the official organ
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expresses strong confidence in the self-de-
termination approach,21 all three give only
the most occasional emphasis to a deter-
ministic view. Oddly enough, the Soviet
media likewise tended to downgrade this
position, but for them such scores represent
a greater deviation from the historical de-
terminism which allegedly dominates their
political thinking.
A-7. Moving now toward some of the
more specific characteristics of the contem-
porary international system, we seek a pre-
liminary and general indication as to how
the American elite would regard (or say
they regard) the power distribution and
balance of the era bounded generally by the
1957 Sputnik launching and the 1960 U-2
incident.
If our N were larger, we might consider
these results rather dramatic, especially
when contrasted to those on the Soviet side.
But neither coder found any statement in
this dimension in the Times editorials that
were sampled, and only a few were found
by the Bulletin and Foreign Affairs coders.
This was, however, a period of disenchant-
ment for many foreign policy formulators
and observers, with the Kremlin demon-
strating an unexpected (for many) techno-
logical capability as well as notable good
fortune in the struggle within the non-
aligned nations. It may also be worthy of
note that, of our three sources, only Foreign
Affairs reflected this pessimistic view, thus
highlighting the fact that it is the least con-
cerned of the three regarding its impact
on mass public opinion. Finally, our gen-
eral observations regarding the impact of
perceived relative power upon policy ob-
tain here as well as on the Soviet side of
the analysis. To date there has been insuf-
ficient collection and interpretation of em-
pirical data to shed much light on the dis-
pute as to whether self-confidence correlates
with more bellicose or more conservative
behavior in nations.
A-8. As a final dimension in the general
issue &dquo;Image of the International Environ-
ment,&dquo; we asked our unknowing respondents
how they viewed the possibility of limited
war remaining limited in the contemporary
system. They tended to be more sanguine
than their Soviet counterparts.
Thus, the general feeling was that with
restraint and cool judgment, we and the
Soviets could engage in military conflicts
21 It is ironic that the official Bulletin should
take so much more a voluntaristic view than
the others, when three of its more articulate
policy-planning "graduates" should have argued
rather cogently for the opposing view. See
Marshall (1954); Halle (1958); and Kennan,
op. cit.
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limited as to space, objectives, weapons,
and commitments, without such conflict
necessarily escalating. Most uncertain was
the Times editorial staff, which predicted
escalation on 40 percent of the occasions in
which the problem was discussed. The Bul-
latin seems to reflect the professionals’ con-
fidence in their own skills, by denying that
keeping such wars limited will be an easy
or natural concomitant of the situation,
while also downgrading the danger of es-
calation. Certain Foreign Affairs authors,
however, when dealing with the matter at
all, tended to echo the position of those who
believed in the restraining effect of strategic
weapons. One might say that the American
elite’s position on this vital dimension is a
hopeful one: aware of the possibility of
escalation, yet not so fearful of it that an
unwillingness to engage in limited war is
conveyed.
B. AMERICAN ELITE EVALUATION
OF THE POWER BALANCE
In the previous paragraphs, we summa-
rized the results of our inquiry into the
American elite’s image of the general inter-
national system, and in dimension A-7 we
sought our first clue as to broad power
trends. In this part, we want to examine
this issue of power balance and distribution
in more specific terms. As suggested above,
we believe perceived relative power to be
one of the more central variables in the be-
havior of nations, but are not at all sure
in which direction such perceptions tend to
move nations.
B-1. Perhaps one of the most crucial ele-
ments in today’s strategic stand-off, and one
that sharply affects its stability, is the de-
gree to which either side can &dquo;ride out&dquo; an
opening attack, preserving enough retalia-
tory force to mount a punitive blow in retri-
bution. More important still is the degree
to which each side’s elite perceives such
retaliatory capabilities. The positions were
responses completing the statement &dquo;Our
strike-back (retaliatory) capability is....&dquo;
The deterrent effect of these statements
is not particularly reassuring. Despite the
wide range of statements on this subject,
there is still a strong admission of high vul-
nerability (26 percent when all media are
combined). As might be anticipated, the
official articulations cluster around the two
extreme positions, often in order to justify
a given policy or budget request, while
those in Foreign Affairs cluster around the
middle (partially vulnerable) position, with
rather infrequent (15 percent) claims of
near-invulnerability. Our sampling of
Times editorials failed to produce a large
enough N to take seriously.
B-2. In a similar vein, our respondents
were asked to complete this statement:
&dquo;We have a military posture capable of
deterring....&dquo;
These responses are not exactly conso-
nant with those under dimension 1, but do
seem to be explicable. Thus, even though
our elites expressed a higher degree of com-
bined confidence in their overall deterrent
capabilities (84 percent) than their views
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on invulnerability might justify, the distri-
bution is quite plausible. Whereas the
Times and the Bulletin are highly con-
cerned with generating such a confident
image, the Foreign Affairs analyst is more
concerned with advocating certain changes;
moreover, this latter journal was a major
vehicle for the limited war-massive retalia-
tion debate during this period. It must also
be borne in mind that one can admit to a
relatively &dquo;high&dquo; degree of vulnerability and
still believe that enough retaliatory force
will remain to deter effectively.
Though we found fewer references to
both these items in the Soviet media, those
that did appear displayed a much narrower
range of opinion. Thus, 75 percent of their
responses indicated a belief in their own
near-invulnerability, with 25 percent sug-
gesting a more limited confidence (partially
vulnerable). And on dimension 2 there
was an unanimous 100 percent articulation
under the &dquo;both&dquo; position, though all such
references were found only in International
Affairs.
B-3. Moving to the hardware component
of articulated and perceived capability, we
seek an indication of the American elite’s
evaluation of comparative progress in the
production and technological development
of weapon systems. The possible evalua-
tions and results are shown below.
In this dimension we find, again, a lower
level of articulated confidence than that dis-
played in the Soviet press, which rated
itself as faster than the United States 98
percent of the time. On the American side,
the Bulletin again reflected the more opti-
mistic view, with both the Times and For-
eign Affairs revealing serious concern in 67
percent and 62 percent of the cases, re-
spectively. Consequently, we get an over-
all picture that suggests serious American
concern, generated to a large extent by
Soviet successes in rocketry and an overre-
action on the part of those who had tended
earlier to belittle their military technology.
B-4. In viewing the contemporary mili-
tary balance (rather than its trend) the
American elite responded as shown below.
Again, a combined picture of restrained
confidence emerges, with the Bulletin once
more reflecting the most optimistic views.
The results of these first four dimensions in
group B illustrate rather nicely the running
controversy over missile gaps, deterrent
gaps, and the like. In each case, we found
the State Department expressing the most
sanguine view, with the academic experts
(nongovernmental for the most part) artic-
ulating the greatest concern.
B-5. Shifting now to some of the broader
aspects of the power balance, we look first
at the images of each side’s alliance system.
The sources were asked to indicate what
seemed to be the basis of our alliances.
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Though our coders found some difficulty
in distinguishing between positions b and c,
they did uncover a fairly consistent pattern,
with frequent recognition not only of the
common need (57, 54, and 64 percent,
respectively) but of the particular self-in-
terest involved in these alliances. In this
case, the Times assumed the normal role of
the Bulletin by emphasizing the ideological
and social solidarity of the alliance mem-
bers, and by downgrading the importance
of these coalitions to our own national in-
terest. None of the American sources, how-
ever, even approached their Soviet counter-
parts, where 84 percent of the references
were to this solidarity, 16 percent to the
common need, and none to their own self-
interest.
B-6. The next four dimensions attempt
to appraise some of the specific elements in
the power of the adversary. Beginning with
a reference to the other’s decisional capa-
bilities, the American elite characterized
Soviet foreign policy planning in the terms
shown below.
One thing that is certain is that none of
our elite samples belittled the Soviet deci-
sion-making process. As might be expected,
the Bulletin tended to exhort via the &dquo;mas-
ter-plan&dquo; image, which has often confused
the American public, but oddly enough so
did the Foreign Affairs writers, though to a
lesser extent. The latter’s figure of 56 per-
cent for the &dquo;masterful and thorough&dquo; posi-
tion may, however, be explained by the
propensity of advocates to exaggerate the
cunning of the adversary in order to justify
the adoption of some highly touted &dquo;plan&dquo;
for our side. The combined result reflects
the normal tendency to impute thorough-
ness and orderly planning to a process when
only the final result is visible, whereas the
observer is able to discern the pluralistic
and contradictory forces at work in the
process at home. Finally, the comparison
with Soviet views of the American policy
process is rather disturbing, since the So-
viet elite classified the United States 74
percent of the time on the &dquo;haphazard&dquo; line,
with 16 and 10 percent for the first two
positions.22
B-7. As to whom the dominant groups
are thought to be in Soviet policy-making,
the American elite responded as follows:
The only surprising result here is the
lack of a single reference to the military
leaders, since many of those responsible
for Times editorials and Foreign Affairs ar-
ticles were later explaining Zhukov’s ouster
as due to the undue (if not preponderant)
influence that Khrushchev allegedly thought
the army was exercising. The difference
between the Soviet and American images of
each other on this dimension is quite strik-
ing-and, it would seem, indicative of pro-
found misunderstanding on the part of the
22 On the other hand, there may be an oc-
casional bargaining advantage for the side per-
ceived as somewhat reckless or unpredictable&mdash;
provided that the perceiver is not himself
addicted to such a style.
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former. Thus, they assigned the dominant
American role to economic and technologi-
cal elites (primarily the former) 78 percent
of the time, with KommunÏ8t showing the
ideological way with a 90 percent score.
B-8. As to the relationship between the
Soviet armaments program and their eco-
nomic system, the American sources took
the three positions as shown.
This dimension was designed primarily
for the Soviet side of the study and clearly
reveals one area (at least) of huge asym-
metry between the two. Whereas our
coders found an average total of 46 refer-
ences to this dimension in the Soviet media,
they found it to be of much lower salience
in the American media.
B-9. Another dimension designed pri-
marily for the other half of our study con-
cerned the fashion in which each expected
the other to meet its demise. Our Ameri-
can sources were coded to ascertain articu-
lations as to how the Soviets would be de-
feated.
This sort of statement was certainly not a
strong preoccupation of the American elite.
Whereas it appeared 58 times in the Soviet
media, our coders only found 16 such ref-
erences in the American materials; and of
these, 13 were in the Bulletin. It is also
noteworthy that only once on the Soviet
side and never on the American side was
reference made to one’s own &dquo;forcible mea-
sures&dquo; ; clearly the explicit threat to use
force was, during this period, being increas-
ingly reserved for specific and critical con-
frontations.23
B-10. Finally, we used a dimension that
tends to combine a number of the variables
in perceived relative power-the predicted
outcome of a general nuclear war.
The frequency of references to United
States victory (4 percent) was considerably
lower than the 37 percent frequency found
on the Soviet side, suggesting that their
elite were either more naive regarding the
nature of contemporary weapons or more
concerned with raising the credibility of
their retaliatory threat. It is somewhat sur-
prising that, while pushing the coexistence
&dquo;war-is-hell&dquo; line, they would have referred
to military victory so much more frequently,
particularly since an equally heavy dose
(37 percent) of &dquo;victory for our side&dquo; state-
ments appeared in their export journal,
International Affaírs-or at least in the En-
glish language edition. This dimension
nicely illustrates the dilemma of both major
powers, in that statements of confidence are
essential to the credibility of threatened
23 It would be useful, for instance, to ascer-
tain the increase, if any, of such references
during the Berlin crisis of 1961 and the Cuba
crisis of 1962.
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strategic retaliation while recognition of
&dquo;tremendous mutual devastation&dquo; plays a
significant role in the peace propaganda
battle.
C. AMERICAN ELITE IMAGE OF SOVIET
OPERATIONAL CODE
Having examined the articulations of the
American elite regarding the international
environment and the distribution of power
therein, let us turn now to their image of
the adversary’s goals and strategies.
C-1. The first dimension concerns the
matter of the Soviet’s primary long-range
goals in world politics, and these were ap-
praised with the percentage distributions
shown below.
Our coders encountered some difficulty
in distinguishing between positions a and
b, but after some extra pretests they settled
on adequate criteria. The distribution of
responses along this continuum were quite
similar to those expressed by the Soviet
elite. Neither side gave much public cre-
dence to the &dquo;self-preservation&dquo; claims of
the other (United States, 1 percent; USSR,
3 percent) or acknowledged with much fre-
quency the existence of legitimate security
interests for the opponent. On the other
hand, each tended to put more emphasis
on the other’s typical drive for power and
influence than on the ominous &dquo;world
domination&dquo; position-68 percent as op-
posed to 31 percent for the United States,
and 73 percent as opposed to 24 percent
for the USSR. Though these attributions of
unlimited ambition to one another are im-
pressive, they are low enough to offer some
prospects of eventual negotiated d6tente.
Had the figures for positions a and b been
reversed, one might have to conclude that
little room for bargaining remained.
C-2. The next dimension deals with the
degree to which the American elite think
(or say they think) that Marxist-Leninist
ideology influences Soviet national security
policy. In completing the statement &dquo;Choos-
ing between security and ideological de-
mands, they would ...&dquo;, the American
sources speculated as shown below.
Positions a and c are admittedly rather
extreme, and we might have replaced &dquo;ig-
nore&dquo; with &dquo;downgrade&dquo; or &dquo;subordinate,&dquo;
but we did want a sharpening of the dis-
tinctions. The results were in a sense rather
encouraging, especially in regard to the
Bulletin with its tendency to &dquo;ideologize&dquo;
on so many of the dimensions. If it is true
that collaboration with an enemy is made
more difficult when he is perceived to be
fanatical, then the 14 percent frequency of
position a is promisingly low. Moreover, on
the Soviet side there was not a single
reference found suggesting that they might
view the United States as ideology-bound;
this, paradoxically enough, fits their own
ideological views as to the factors that im-
pel nations to certain forms of behavior. At
the other end of the continuum we also find
relatively low average scores, with only 29
percent of our items suggesting that the
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USSR is perceived as playing a pure &dquo;power
and security&dquo; game. The bulk of our re-
spondents (57 percent) tended to assign
more or less complementary roles to security
and ideological considerations in Soviet
strategy.
C-3. As to the major instrument in the
Soviet’s pursuit of their foreign policy goals,
the American sources reflected a range of
emphases.
Though Foreign Affairs and the Times
tended to see political and military subver-
sion as the primary tool of Soviet expansion-
ism, the State Department spokesmen were
inclined to put greater emphasis on the
even less direct techniques of penetration
and the manipulation of social movements.
The combined results suggest that little
remains of the tendency to view the Soviet
threat as primarily a military one, except
the stereotype that much of the critical and
articulate American public still holds regard-
ing the adversary. And although the Amer-
ican elite is now inclined to see the mani-
fold aspects of Soviet aggressiveness, the
Soviet elite still has a strong tendency (59
percent) to view American policy as being
primarily reliant on physical force, with
only occasional concern over our economic
and social penetration techniques (17 per-
cent).
C-4. American positions in this dimen-
sion rated those characteristics of Soviet be-
havior that are most indicative of aggressive
intentions.
Here we see one of the more striking ex-
amples of asymmetry in Soviet-American
mutual perceptions. Whereas the former
expressed almost no concern (8 percent)
over American preparedness per se, our
elite mentioned Soviet preparedness as most
indicative of Soviet aggressiveness 87 per-
cent of the time. Conversely, sharp Soviet
concern over American alliances (54 per-
cent) and American bases (38 percent)
contrasts with American figures of 12 and
1 percent, respectively. This difference in-
dicates not only that the USSR has few
overseas bases in the literal sense of the
word, but that we view their alliances as
something less than the effective, voluntary
association of sovereign states, allied, as
they claim, in a common strategic cause.
C-5. As to the general nature of the So-
viet strategic doctrine, the American elite
characterized it as shown below.
As crucial as this dimension is, it might
better have been omitted. On the Soviet
side, only International Affairs discussed it
with any frequency (coding 55, 45, and 0
percent, respectively); on the American side,
the most frequent reference (6) was in the
Bulletin. The distinction between positions
a and b, it might be noted, was difficult to
communicate to our coders, suggesting that
461
our lexicon may need some improvement in
this case.24
C-6. Regarding the primary purpose of
the Soviet outer space programs, American
sources scored it as shown below.
Though the tendency is certainly one of
discounting the search for scientific knowl-
edge per se, the American elite took a con-
siderably less cynical position than did their
opposite numbers, who scored the United
States 100 percent in position a. Perhaps
the most important point to emerge from
this dimension is that, by scoring the So-
viets 35 percent on the prestige motivation,
the Americans reveal the degree of impor-
tance that they themselves attach to space
exploration achievements as a means to
national prestige.
C-7. The final dimension in this issue
pertains to the motivation behind the other
side’s foreign aid programs. Asked which
of the following best characterized the So-
viet purpose in rendering economic and
technical assistance to the underdeveloped
and nonaligned nations, the American elite
responded as follows:
Again, the American elite-like their op-
posite numbers-are hardly prone to at-
tribute altruism to the other side. Though
they did not match the latter’s score of 100,
0, and 0 percent, they came rather close,
with only the Foreign Affairs contributors
showing an occasional tendency to look at
other than the obvious, short-run, power-
maximization considerations.
D. AMERICAN EXPRESSIONS OF OWN
OPERATIONAL CODE
The purely American side of this study
concludes with an attempt to ascertain
some of the more directly relevant dimen-
sions in American foreign policy views.
Having discussed the American elite’s artic-
ulations regarding their image of the inter-
national system, the distribution of power,
and the adversary’s operational code, we
now examine those articulations regarding
their own operational code.
D-1. The first dimension is designed to
shed light on the general criteria used in
making foreign policy decisions, especially
in terms of ongoing debate between the
realists and the idealists.25 The next table
shows how American sources rated these
three criteria.
24 Two studies that are highly relevant to the
period under review are Dinerstein (1959)
and Garthoff (1958).
25 The issue was nicely drawn some years
ago in an article by Cook and Moos (1952)
and another by Morgenthau (1952).
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These results show not only that the elite
as a whole tend to put heavy emphasis on
ethical considerations, but that those in gov-
ernment (during this 1957-60 period, at
least) differed sharply with those writing
for Foreign Affairs. The Times scored
somewhere between the other two media
on all three lines. On the other hand, it
cannot be overemphasized that this is a
study of articulated rather than applied
criteria, and in the realm of political morals
there tends to be a wide disparity. Note,
too, the similarity with the Soviet scores
of 27, 0, and 73 percent.
D-2. One of the more crucial elements
in competitive coexistence concerns the
prerequisites for successful negotiation:
how does relative power correlate with such
success? The American elite said that suc-
cessful negotiations are most likely to occur
when:
When these figures are compared with
the very similar ones for the USSR we see
a classical case of the central dilemma in
diplomacy. Each side speaks-and often
acts-as if it would employ any power ad-
vantage it enjoyed in only the most benign
fashion, while expressing the conviction
that the other would exploit a similar ad-
vantage with considerable ruthlessness.
Thus each tends to strive for relative superi-
ority before entering serious negotiation,
and with each so striving-and almost in-
variably with only a transitory success-
genuine bargaining and mutual compromise
are seldom achieved.
D-3. Much in the same vein, American
elite articulations were coded to indicate
the way in which they thought peace can
best be maintained.
One conclusion that emerges is that nei-
ther side places much confidence in inter-
national organization, with the slight Amer-
ican edge (21 percent as opposed to 15
percent) a function of the T imes’ forceful
pro-United Nations editorial position. As
to the more contemporaneously important
issue, we find a sharp but expected differ-
ence. Whereas the Soviets rate coopera-
tion (or peaceful coexistence) 67 to 18 per-
cent over a peace-through-strength line, the
American emphasis is in the opposite direc-
tion by 47 to 32 percent. While the inter-
national politics specialist may be permitted
a skeptical attitude toward both positions,
one might infer that-if mere articulations
on this type of question are worth consider-
ing-the USSR expresses a stronger pro-
pensity toward détente than does the
United States. Having said this, however,
it must be emphasized that the former is
using a controlled press to urge a party
line, whereas the latter is expressing the re-
sult of disenchantment by way of relatively
free media.
D-4. Our next dimension concerns the
perceived applicability of limited war in
pursuit of American strategic interests.
Here is another case in which the dif-
ference between the functions of periodicals
markedly affects the results. As an articula-
tor of official policy and hence a guide to
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American behavior for others, the Bulletin
must not only emphasize the peaceableness
of our policy (retaliation only, 70 percent)
but also play the conflicting role of deter-
rence via subtle threat (a reasonable instru-
ment of policy, 25 percent). Though the
Times assumes a similar, but unofficial,
role during specific crises and diplomatic
impasses, in its day-to-day editorializing it
can afford to express a perpetually more
peaceful line. On the other hand, the av-
erage26 Foreign Af fairs contributor gener-
ally plays a more detached and critical role,
with less concern for the impact upon opin-
ion among our adversaries, allies, or neu-
trals. Hence the reversal in emphasis be-
tween this journal and the others regarding
the role of limited war. It should also be
noted that this was the period during which
the assault on the massive retaliation doc-
trine appeared, with a corresponding empha-
sis on the importance of limited war doc-
trines and capabilities.
D-5. The next two dimensions continue
our concern with military policy, but focus
rather on two of the more crucial chrono-
logical variables in the relationship between
weapons control and the larger political
setting. The first raises the question of
whether arms reduction or elimination must
precede, accompany, or follow the settle-
ment of outstanding political and territorial
conflicts or the reduction of international
tensions.
There seems to be wide agreement among
our three sets of elites, but the scores them-
selves suggest considerable indecision and
disagreement. Though the dominant posi-
tion is that disarmament need not necessar-
ily wait upon the settlement of political
issues or the reduction of East-West ten-
sions (47 percent), there was frequent ad-
herence to the opposing view that it must
precede (28 percent) or that they must ac-
company each other (25 percent). Appar-
ently the Soviet elite (scoring in position b
90 percent of the time) have either resolved
the arms-tension dilemma more satisfacto-
rily than their American counterparts, or
have ignored it in their eagerness to push a
particular disarmament line.
D-6. In the same vein, we seek an indi-
cation of the American views on inspection
and control in multilateral disarmament.
26 It should be emphasized that although a
considerable proportion of articles are written
by policy-makers and their close associates,
most are not.
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As confused as the American elite ap-
peared to be on the timing of arms reduc-
tion vis-a-vis political settlement, they were
extremely decisive on the question of con-
trols and inspection. Only one reference to
position a was found in all three periodicals,
while the preponderance were in favor of
the &dquo;controls first&dquo; approach. Especially
was this true of the Bulletin (91 percent),
which has emphasized this view for years.
The Times could, on the other hand, be
somewhat more flexible and agree 44 per-
cent of the time that disarmament and con-
trols might develop concurrently.
Also striking is the contrast to the Soviet
results, where 71 percent of the responses
were for simultaneous measures, and 29
percent for reduction preceding controls.
On the verbal level at least, there is little
doubt that there exists a wide gap on the
disarmament-inspection question. How-
ever, if we look not so much at the relative
strengths of positions a and b and their
mutual exclusiveness, but at the fact that
the Soviets scored 71 percent on simulta-
neity and the Times and Foreign Affairs
scored 44 and 50 percent, respectively, on
this position, there may be a remote possi-
bility of bipolar compromise on this crucial
issue. It might even be suggested that if
we and the USSR are to ever break out of
the armament-tension dilemma, it will be
largely as a result of concurrence on posi-
tion c.
D-7. Closely linked with the disarma-
ment problem is that of international politi-
cal organization (see Singer, 1963a). Cen-
tral in the future of such organization is the
type of decision-making procedure estab-
lished. The three suggested alternatives
and American responses are shown below.
The contrast between the US and Soviet
positions is striking. Whereas the latter
came close to unanimity (100 percent in
Pravda and Kommunist,) on the &dquo;great-
power unanimity&dquo; position, the American
average was only 13 percent for this posi-
tion. On the other hand, the American
sources did tend to shy away somewhat from
the straight majority concept, with 56 per-
cent calling instead for a combination of
great-power unanimity plus general ap-
proval of other members. The relevance of
both sets of scores for the various troika
proposals needs further investigation.
D-8. Turning to an issue that combines
a number of strategic and political consid-
erations, we seek an indication of the Amer-
ican elite’s views on the various disengage-
ment proposals current during the 1957-60
period.
The only conclusion that emerges is that
the dominant view was a skeptical one (40
percent), but that considerable difference
of opinion existed. Foreign Affairs reflected
the most skeptical point of view, but none
of the three found the issue as salient as
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one might have anticipated, considering the
stir caused by Kennan’s Reith Lectures
(summarized in Kennan, 1959).
D-9. The next dimension deals with the
American articulation of their own motiva-
tion for giving economic and technical as-
sistance to neutrals.
These results illustrate the profound dif-
ference between each side’s self-image and
that held of it by the other. When this
question was put in terms of the others
motivation, the USSR assigned position a to
the United States 100 percent of the time,
and the United States scored its adversary
in the same fashion 97 percent of the time.
Also noteworthy is the fact that the Soviets
recognized this motivation for themselves on
only 5 percent of the occasions compared
with a rather frank 42 percent admission
score for the United States.
D-10. The final dimension seeks some
clues as to the elite views on free interna-
tional trade. The American results are
shown below.
Like other abstract virtues, everyone is
in favor of free international trade; thus, the
USSR and the United States scored 97 and
98 percent, respectively, on position c,
though each has consistently acted some-
what differently. Though expressing a be-
lief in the utility of free trade as a tension
reducer, or as an aid in the solution of polit-
ical differences, each side has nevertheless
been compelled by these very political dif-
ferences to obstruct any serious effort to
achieve such mutual interdependence. For
both protagonists in the Cold War, economic
policy is a weapon whose function is to
strengthen oneself and weaken one’s adver-
sary (Liska, 1960).
Findings: Comparative
Though frequent asides of a comparative
nature have already appeared, it might be
useful to recapitulate here in a more sys-
tematic fashion. On the matter of salience,
first, it appears that the Soviet and Ameri-
can foreign policy elites reveal only a par-
tial similarity in their preoccupations. Thus,
bearing in mind the sample of possible
media and of possible foreign policy dimen-
sions, we find a positive correlation of 0.32
between the attention which the two elites
devote to the various dimensions. This
Pearson R correlation, given an N of 35
dimensions, is significant at the 0.03 level.
To put it another way, knowing the salience
distributions of one side, we could predict
those of the other side with some modest
confidence.
Beginning with the image of the inter-
national environment, we find that neither
side expresses a particularly objective or
even realistic view. The Soviets never saw
the system as one characterized by and con-
tributing to incessant conflict, and the
Americans only did so in 7 percent of the
cases. Thus each tended to assume that
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conflict was not inherent in the system, but
flowed from periodic peculiarities thereof.
For the Americans, conflict tended to be
seen as a function of differing ideologies or
social systems (58 percent), while for the
Soviets, it was more often (75 percent) the
result of aggression on the part of the
&dquo;imperialist camp&dquo; led by the United States.
And in describing the contemporary bipolar
conflict, the Americans again took a more
ideologized position, asserting that it was
between two competing &dquo;belief systems,&dquo;
while the Soviets saw it more in terms of
competing &dquo;social systems.&dquo; As to its being
essentially a power struggle, neither would
(or could) give this interpretation much
emphasis; the Americans scored this posi-
tion only 31 percent of the time and the
Soviets did so with a 35 percent frequency.
As to the origins or causes of military
conflict, both sides converged sharply. For
the United States, war was seen as the re-
sult of &dquo;one state’s aggressiveness&dquo; 63 per-
cent of the time, and for the Soviets it was
88 percent. Thus, even though the two
elites differed on both the character of the
system and the present struggle, each had
no difficulty in translating general views
into rather specific allegations.27 The con-
vergence is even more sharply revealed
when each expressed its views as to the
emerging nature of the current confronta-
tion. The Americans scored 53 percent on
economic and political competition and 40
percent on cooperative coexistence, with
their opposite numbers coming out with
figures of 53 and 46 percent, respectively.
Neither side gave frequent expression to
the &dquo;must inevitably clash&dquo; position, with
scores of 7 and 1 percent, respectively.
Shifting the emphasis slightly, we dis-
cover that our two elites first disagree and
then agree on their views of prediction and
inevitability in international politics. The
Americans tended to feel that the prediction
of international events was &dquo;almost impos-
sible&dquo; (57 percent) or only &dquo;occasionally
possible&dquo; (36 percent), and, consistently
enough, refused to accept the proposition
that the nations are &dquo;pawns of great forces&dquo;
(3 percent). They tended, rather, to take
a more pragmatic view and embrace the
intermediate position that nations are
&dquo;limited by realities&dquo; (77 percent). The
Soviets, on the other hand, came out very
close to the Americans on all three deter-
minism dimensions, but nevertheless ex-
pressed a strong degree (69 percent) of
confidence in the predictability of interna-
tional events. In the classical terms of
Marxism and Leninism, this apparent in-
consistency is easily explained: the van-
guard of the proletariat, though armed with
a &dquo;scientific&dquo; view of history, replete with
all its inherent &dquo;inevitabilities,&dquo; must also
act in the appropriate revolutionary manner
to hasten the inevitable. Here, as else-
where, our results strongly confirm what we
would expect the ideology to produce, but
it does not necessarily follow that the Krem-
lin will actually conduct its foreign policy
in accordance with such articulations.
Turning from the general images of the
international system, let us now compare
the ways in which Soviet and American
foreign policy elites seem to perceive the
present and projected distribution of power.
To begin with the specific dimensions of
military power, each tends to stress the
near-invulnerablility of its retaliatory forces,
but the Soviets express a more uniform con-
27 An excellent analysis of this "causes of
war" question is in Waltz (1959). Though
Waltz and the author sharply disagree on cer-
tain questions of research strategy, both concur
that the most accurate and useful positing of
the "cause" of war is in the total international
system. See the review article, Singer (1960).
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fidence (75 percent as opposed to 42 per-
cent). The United States, on the other
hand, has experienced sharp internal de-
bate over this issue, and thus we find the
Bulletin describing these forces as &dquo;nearly
invulnerable&dquo; 64 percent of the time, while
the specialists in Foreign Affairs classified
them as &dquo;highly vulnerable&dquo; 28 percent of
the time and as &dquo;partially vulnerable&dquo; 57
percent of the time. As to progress in the
development and production of advanced
weapons systems, this contrast is even
sharper. Almost every reference to this
dimension in the Soviet press termed their
own technological progress as &dquo;faster&dquo; than
that of the United States (98 percent),
whereas the American press-reflecting the
impact of Sputnik I and II, etc.-scored
their own weapon technology as developing
more slowly than that of the opponent 45
percent of the time. In terms of overall
military posture, however, this difference
disappears. In other words, Americans may
express inferiority in specific power posi-
tions, but still say 84 percent of the time
that they are capable of deterring both
limited and nuclear attacks; their opposite
numbers expressed such confidence 100
percent of the time. If, however, deter-
rence requires high credibility on the part
of the deterree, the acknowledgment of
specific weaknesses may well tend to vitiate
the effects of articulated overall confidence.
Such a possibility is dramatically illustrated
in comparing the respective evaluations of
the &dquo;present military balance.&dquo; The Soviets
rate it as in their own favor 95 percent of
the time, as contrasted to the remarkably
low figure of 52 percent for the Americans’
self-confidence articulation; even the Bul-
letin appraised the balance in favor of the
US only 74 percent of the time.
When predictions about war are made,
the same general pattern emerges. Whereas
the American elite predict &dquo;tremendous mu-
tual devastation&dquo; with an 89 percent fre-
quency, their opposite numbers do so only
53 percent of the time. Conversely, the
Soviets anticipate &dquo;victory for us&dquo; 37 per-
cent of the time with only 4 percent for the
Americans. Only when it comes to the
limitation of limited war is the &dquo;tough-
timid&dquo; classification reversed. That is, the
American elite expressed high confidence
in the possibility of keeping limited war
limited (only 19 percent for &dquo;probably es-
calate into general war&dquo;), while those in
the USSR made this fearful prediction 75
percent of the time. It should be noted,
however, that the USSR finds this position
essential to its propaganda line, whereas a
large segment of the American elite has a
strong vested interest in a belief in the
limitability of limited war, especially the
limitability of wars in which tactical nuclear
weapons are used.28
The next three dimensions bear on the
mutual appraisals of some key elements in
one another’s power base, with the first two
dealing with relative decisional capabilities.
Thoroughly anticipated would be the Soviet
allegation that the dominant influence in
American foreign policy is the economic-
technological elite (78 percent) and the
American belief that the political Party
leaders dominate Soviet policy (90 per-
cent). But the specific appraisals of effec-
tiveness did not seem to fit the pattern.
The Soviets, despite alleging the existence
of an economic elite conspiracy in American
foreign policy, nevertheless suggest that the
policy itself is one of a &dquo;haphazard respond-
ing to events&dquo; 74 percent of the time, and
only allude to a &dquo;masterful and thorough&dquo;
policy planning with a 16 percent fre-
28 For an analysis of this problem and an in-
dication of the declining popularity of tactical
nuclear weapons, see Halperin (1962).
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quency. On the other hand, the American
elite take the apocalyptic view that Soviet
policy is masterful and thorough 56 percent
of the time, and recognize its erratic nature
only 36 percent of the time. As to the soli-
darity of their alliances as indicators of
strength and decisional capability, the So-
viets claim that theirs are based on a &dquo;simi-
larity of social systems and beliefs&dquo; with
an 84 percent frequency contrasted to a
17 percent claim by the Americans; the
latter tend rather to emphasize the &dquo;com-
mon need for protection against aggression&dquo;
(55 percent).
Looking at another dimension, we found
that the Soviet elite had not yet begun to
give full adherence to the then-emerging
Khrushchev dictum that the American ar-
maments program is detrimental to the
American economy, with only an 18 per-
cent reference to this position. Rather the
standard line that the program is essential
to economic prosperity appeared with an
80 percent frequency. There was almost no
concern with this relationship on the other
side.
Concluding the general appraisal of rela-
tive power and power bases, our results
suggest a marked asymmetry in views. In
line with the above-mentioned elements in
the power relationships, the USSR claimed
to perceive the shift in their favor almost
every time (99 percent) and predicted an
American collapse resulting from Commu-
nist &dquo;successes elsewhere&dquo; (45 percent) and
the &dquo;weaknesses and contradictions&dquo; of the
American system (53 percent). The Amer-
ican elite also tended to adhere to their
emerging pattern: a more limited degree of
self-confidence. Thus, they scored the bal-
ance as &dquo;remaining static&dquo; 42 percent of the
time, with only a 25 percent score on &dquo;shift-
ing in our favor.&dquo; Thus, when asked how
the adversary’s system will collapse, they
put much more emphasis on &dquo;its own
weaknesses and contradictions&dquo; (87 percent)
than did the Soviets, and less on &dquo;success
of our system elsewhere&dquo; (13 percent) than
did their opposite numbers.
As suggested throughout, the implications
of these contrasting appraisals of the con-
temporary and projected power balance in
the military, economic, and political realms
are far from clear. The state of empirically-
based international relations theory is not
such that one can safely make correlative,
no less causal, statements regarding the
impact of perceived relative power on be-
havior (even assuming that these coded
statements are in fact reflections of per-
ceived power rather than self-congratula-
tions, propaganda, or semiautomatic reiter-
ations of the inherited dogmas). Thus, it
would seem to be equally plausible to as-
sume that these Soviet indications of ex-
treme self-confidence might precede aggres-
sive behavior as well as conservative behav-
ior. The more crucial variables have to do
with the way in which present and pre-
dicted power differences are combined. In
other words, if an essentially &dquo;revisionist&dquo;
power perceives itself as currently abreast
of the conservative or status-quo power,
and anticipates either holding its own or
drawing ahead, there is probably less tend-
ency to resort to force than if it expects
to fall behind again. If it perceives itself
as behind, but drawing abreast or ahead of
the opponent, there might also be a low
predicted propensity to violence. However,
the international system is such that the
revisionist must anticipate that the over-
taken power may well resort to force while
ahead in order to remain so. Thus, we are
again brought face to face with the di-
lemma of the application and use of power
in order to acquire power or modify a
power ratio.
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Turning now to the way in which each
elite perceives the operational code of the
other, we find a mixture of symmetry and
asymmetry as well as consistency and incon-
sistency in the reciprocal images. As an
example of the latter, neither side admits
(or believes?) that the other’s dominant
goal is self-preservation ( 1 and 3 percent
were the scores), yet each says with a very
high frequency (United States, 86 percent;
USSR, 100 percent) that the other would
choose &dquo;security&dquo; over ideological consider-
ations in making policy decisions. In the
same vein, there is almost no willingness to
grant that the other’s military doctrine is a
retaliatory one. On the few occasions on
which this item appeared in either set of
media, the tendency was to see it as either
preventative or preemptive. The symmetri-
cal tendency to impute aggressive designs
to the adversary is also borne out in the
low degree to which each attributes scien-
tific progress as the motive behind the
other’s space program. Likewise, almost all
references to the other’s foreign aid moti-
vations are in terms of &dquo;strengthen their
side and weaken ours&dquo; (96 and 100 per-
cent), while each articulated more altruis-
tic motives when discussing its own aid pro-
grams.
As to the lack of symmetry in the mutual
perceptions, these are best revealed in the
dimensions dealing with one another’s for-
eign policy instruments. The Soviets allege
that the major instrument of American
policy is &dquo;military force&dquo; (59 percent), with
political subversion and socioeconomic pen-
etration scored at the 24 and 17 percent
levels; whereas the American elite score
only 28 percent for Soviet military force,
with 35 and 37 percent for the less violent
techniques. And while the Soviets say they
are primarily threatened by American bases
(38 percent) and alliances (54 percent),
the Americans see home-based Soviet capa-
bilities as the best indicator of aggressive
intent, with an 87 percent score.
Turning from these various classes of
images to the more specific articulations of
their own operational codes, we again find
a mixture of symmetry and asymmetry.
Verbal agreement between the adversaries
is high on the two opening dimensions.
Each puts heavy emphasis on the impor-
tance of moral principles and means in
foreign policy (79 percent for the United
States and 73 percent for the USSR), nei-
ther is willing to express serious concern for
the neutralist bloc reactions (10 and 0 per-
cent, respectively), and only a low endorse-
ment (11 and 27 percent) of the &dquo;national
interest&dquo; dictum is manifested. But the
greatest display of reciprocal self-righteous-
ness and mutual distrust occurs on the
&dquo;conditions for successful negotiation&dquo; di-
mension. By a ratio of approximately 2 to
1, each claims that negotiations are more
likely to be successful when its own side is
stronger than when there is approximate
parity. (The Soviet scores were 66 and 34
percent, while American scores were 69
and 29 percent.) Almost never does either
see any hope for success in negotiations
when the adversary is (or is perceived to
be) stronger; the phrase is &dquo;negotiating
from weakness.&dquo; The results on these two
dimensions seem to suggest a rather dim
prospect for the negotiated settlement of
major Soviet-American conflicts.
This pessimistic view is further reinforced
by the results on the &dquo;peace can best be
maintained by&dquo; dimension. The Soviets
voted for &dquo;major power cooperation&dquo; with
a 67 percent frequency, and the Americans
did so 32 percent of the time. Despite the
disparity, it is clear that each expresses
some confidence in a process whose pre-
conditions neither side seems willing to ac-
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cept. Hence we should be somewhat sur-
prised by the tendency-particularly on
the Soviet side-to downgrade &dquo;peace
through military superiority&dquo; and to up-
grade the major power cooperation line.
The most discouraging element, however,
is the extremely low frequency with which
each looks to &dquo;effective international orga-
nization&dquo; (15 percent for the USSR and
21 percent for the United States). This
relative indifference toward international
organization is also borne out by the find-
ings along the voting power dimension.
Each side prefers some form of the great
power veto to a large extent, the USSR
scoring a combined 77 percent on the two
pro-veto positions and the United States
scoring 69 percent.
Closely related to this set of concerns is
that concern regarding multilateral reduc-
tion and elimination of armaments. On
both of these, the two sides revealed
strongly differing views. As to the question
of whether political settlement must be
reached before or along with disarmament,
the American elite scored a combined 53
percent on the &dquo;precede&dquo; and &dquo;accompany&dquo;
positions, compared with only 10 percent
for the Soviet elite. Conversely, the latter
expressed a belief in disarmament without
political settlement with a 90 percent fre-
quency, compared with 47 percent for the
Americans. And on the related question of
inspection and controls, the asymmetry of
views was equally pronounced. Thus, the
Soviets scored 100 percent on the combined
positions of reductions preceding (29 per-
cent) or accompanying (71 percent) con-
trols and inspection, while the United
States scored only 17 percent on these two.
Conversely, the United States called for the
establishment of controls before any arms
reduction 83 percent of the time. As sug-
gested earlier, the only promising note is
that the Soviets accepted the principle of
simultaneity 71 percent of the time even
during that period, while the Times and
Foreign Affairs scored 44 and 50 percent,
respectively. If there are to be successful
negotiations for the multilateral reduction
of either conventional or nuclear weapons,
it seems rather certain that the simultaneity
principle will have to be adhered to.
Next we looked at a pair of policy alter-
natives that fall short of nuclear war at one
end and total disarmament at the other.
The first is that of limited war and the other
is disengagement, and each of these fur-
ther serves to illustrate dissimilarities in the
Soviet and American operational codes. As
to the appropriate role of limited war, there
were few Soviet references to it, but these
always rejected the notion that it might be
a &dquo;reasonable instrument of policy,&dquo; arguing
that it should be used only for retaliatory
purposes or as a threat to back up diplo-
matic demands. The Americans, on the
other hand, not only talked about it more
often, but expressed approval of it as a
reasonable instrument of policy on 31 per-
cent of the occasions (never, however, in
the Times, and only 25 percent in the Bul-
letin). However, both sides did tend to
emphasize the retaliatory function. As to
the various disengagement plans, the asym-
metry is more striking. Whereas the Soviets
view them as &dquo;a promising way to avoid
war&dquo; with a 98 percent frequency, with
only 2 percent of the references to the no-
tion that they might be &dquo;risky, but valuable
if carefully negotiated,&dquo; the American elite
take an exceptionally dim view of such
plans. On nearly half (40 percent) of the
occasions, they were classified as &dquo;essenti-
ally a form of appeasement or retreat,&dquo; with
27 and 33 percent distribution in the &dquo;risky
but valuable&dquo; and &dquo;promising&dquo; positions.
On the final dimensions of foreign aid
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TABLE 3
SYMMETRY OF ATTITUDES AS INDICATED BY HIGHEST SCORING
POSITION ON EACH DIMENSION
and free international trade, each pays lip
service to certain ideals, but departs mark-
edly from them in practice. Both claim to
view trade as a tension-reducing device and
a precursor to political settlement (97 and
98 percent), but these articulations clash
sharply with the actual trade policies of
each. Both protagonists, given the per-
ceived probability of war, must and do
follow a policy that aims, among other
things, to prevent the other’s stockpiling
of strategic materials, developing certain
industries, or gaining access to key resources
and markets. And in the foreign aid strug-
gle, we also see that economic policies are
the handmaiden of political considerations.
On the American side, there is at least the
admission (42 percent) that aid is used to
&dquo;strengthen our side and weaken theirs,&dquo;
but this varies considerably depending upon
whether the audience is an appropriations
subcommittee or a visiting African.
Given these results, it might be useful to
indicate the extent to which the two foreign
policy elites compare and contrast. Cer-
tainly the confusing notion of &dquo;mirror
images,&dquo; which has so preoccupied some
behavioral scientists of late, turns out
to be less than fully substantiated-though
by no means contradicted. Assuming for
the moment that by mirror image we imply
a symmetry in outlook, let us examine
Tables 3 and 4. In the former, we see the
frequency with which both sides came out
highest on the same position, and in Table
4 are the chi-square correlations between
their scores. As the first of them indicates,
the degree to which each elite sees itself,
the other, and the world in identical terms
is not very impressive; on only 14 (17, if
we include ties for first position) of the 35
dimensions do they give most frequent ex-
pression to the same position. And the
similarities and differences are evenly dis-
tributed among the four basic groups of
issues. Likewise, if we turn to Table 4,
which is intended to reveal the significance
of the Soviet-American differences, we find
that in 20 of the 35 dimensions the differ-
ences are great enough to have had only a
1 percent probability of occurring by
chance. Conversely, in only 13 are the dis-
tributions similar enough to exceed the 10
percent level. Thus, by the criteria of either
table, we find an appreciable lack of sym-
metry in articulated outlooks. Even if the
&dquo;mirror image&dquo; metaphor suggests that A





































































B the characteristics it discerns in itself,
little such tendency emerges. On the other
hand, if it merely implies that each side
tends to view the other in similarly negative
terms, then, of course, there is something
to the metaphor. That is, in issue group C
(image of the other’s operational code) we
see that in only 2 of the 7 dimensions are
there any statistically significant differences.
In any event, we need feel no surprise that
a study such as this should reveal a strong
tendency toward ethnocentrism, condemna-
tion, and stereotypy within the foreign
policy elites of two societies engaged in so
intense and profound a rivalry.
Summary and Policy Implications
In this study we have attempted to uti-
lize content analysis in order to shed some
light on certain aspects of Soviet and Amer-
ican foreign policy. More specifically, our
concern was with the way in which selected
elites on each side viewed-during the
three-year period 1957-60-some of the
recurrent variables in international relations
generally, and Soviet-American relations
particularly. Despite the previously ac-
knowledged risks implicit in reliance upon
articulations as indicators of actual and po-
tential behavior, we believe this method has
helped turn up here some of the key ele-
ments in the foreign policy operational code
on each side. While much of this informa-
tion was already generally accepted in the
scholarly and governmental community,
and nothing particularly unexpected has
emerged, we believe that the data and
interpretations that emanate are useful.
First of all, there are many conflicting
models that allegedly describe and explain
the behavior of these (or any) two powers,
and any new empirically-based evidence
can always contribute to the confirmation,
disconfirmation, or modification of such
models as do exist. Second, there is the
widely perceived virtue of examining the
behavior and relationships of systems, orga-
nizations, and groups from as many points
of view as possible. Thus, one might want
to combine the results of studies based on
such initially disparate phenomena as for-
mal ideology, past military strategy, physi-
cal resources, technological capabilities,
demographic characteristics, economic insti-
tutions, political systems, elite structures,
past performance in international organiza-
tions, and so forth. Each might reasonably
be expected to help illuminate a nation’s
operational code vis-A-vis others in the
international system. So it is with elite
articulations, which constitute one set of
phenomena that should help to describe,
explain, and predict the behavior of nations.
Third, we believe that the more empirically
observable the phenomena are, the more
likely they are to generate accurate results.
And while a heavy measure of inference is
required in this particular case, it seems to
be less than that required by the analysis
of many other types of phenomena.
Bearing these assets and liabilities in
mind, let us now go somewhat beyond the
strict limits of our data and summarize some
possible implications for the near future.
One of the striking things to emerge is the
presence of two particular sets of variables
which tend to interact in a reinforcing and
dangerous fashion. First, our results con-
firm that the United States and the USSR
not only have an impressive range of in-
compatible goals and clashes of interest,
but that each nation’s foreign policy elite is
aware of this. Second, each society reveals
a powerful tendency to act and to speak in
such a way as to exacerbate these differ-
ences. Each is prone to underestimate the
degree to which its own behavior and artic-
ulations help to confirm and reinforce the
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negative and fearful view that the other
holds toward it; we uncovered very little
awareness during the three-year period
under scrutiny that either side could (by
perhaps paying slightly less attention to its
domestic drum beaters) help alleviate the
other’s equally compelling need to do like-
wise. In addition, each tends to misallocate
the &dquo;blame&dquo; for the contemporary state of
affairs. Rather than recognize the extent
to which the faulty organization of the
international system, combined with the
speed and destructiveness of nuclear-missile
technology, is responsible for the intensity
of the conflict and its propensity to violence,
each succumbs to the convenient and satis-
fying view that the other is the sole or
primary villain. Without neglecting the
profound differences in goals, we must as-
sume that the environment largely induces
the behavior that is manifested; moreover,
each has within its power the ability to begin
the slow and painful modification of that
environment toward a condition in which
such self-defeating and mutually disadvan-
tageous policies might become far less nec-
essary.
To summarize, it may be said that our
inquiry into the Soviet and American opera-
tional codes confirms the impression that
both major powers have been appallingly
slow in discovering the strategies that may
enable them to survive the present while
shaping the future. The international sys-
tem has changed appreciably since the
1957-1960 period, and while Washington
and Moscow seem to recognize such change,
they have been reluctant to pay the price of
adaptation. Just as the coalitions began to
loosen, and diplomacy once again became
possible, the United States shifted (or
drifted) to a new military doctrine based on
the implied threats of a &dquo;credible [or full]
first-strike capability.&dquo; If the interest was
to strengthen our diplomatic hand, the re-
sults were, at best, mixed. Such a strategic
preponderance may, for example, have been
crucial in inducing the withdrawal of Soviet
missiles from Cuba, but we cannot blink the
possibility that it may well have provoked
such adventurism in the first place. Though
the &dquo;full first-strike&dquo; superiority is no longer
official doctrine, our move toward a more
conservative and stabilizing posture has
been only partial at best. Moreover we
have continued to follow a double standard,
via military intervention in areas well within
the adversary’s sphere of influence. The
Soviet Union has likewise found it most dif-
ficult to move away from the traditional
doctrines of &dquo;self-help.&dquo; Perhaps as serious
as the Cuban adventure and the constant
appeal to violence in the nonaligned areas
has been their obsessive obstructionism in
the disarmament negotiations. Though
neither superpower has been enthusiastic
about this rather promising approach toward
modification of the international system,
the United States seems to have moved
much closer to a responsible position than
has the USSR.
Similarly, if competent diplomacy is to
serve as a span between the remnants of
anarchy and the rudimentary phases of
order in the mid-twentieth century, neither
elite has shown sufficient awareness of its
requirements. On the domestic scene, as
our study clearly reveals, they go to exces-
sive lengths to exaggerate the virtues of
self and the viciousness of the other. The
consequent strengthening of the home-front
jingoists makes honest compromise a most
awkward, costly, and unlikely mode of con-
flict management. And on the global scene,
this same effort to dichotomize has created
a Manichean world in which all who are not
with us must be classed as against us. Thus
Mao’s China and De Gaulle’s France, by
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resorting to standard diplomatic ploys, have
been castigated as disloyal to their alliances
and treated as pariahs by their respective
bloc leaders. As inefficient as nineteenth-
century diplomacy may have been as a
means of peaceful adjustment, most of the
evidence suggests that bipolar confrontation
and rigid Cold War strategies hold even less
promise.
Are these maladaptive practices a func-
tion of legitimate national interests, incom-
patible value systems, or some mixture of
these plus short-sighted and inept foreign
policy articulation? On the basis of this
study, we are inclined to the latter view.
The results suggest the serious degree to
which the respective foreign policy elites
continue to create the conditions which
make diplomatic innovation almost impos-
sible. One or both of them not only insist
on persuading their domestic audiences that
the other is an implacable enemy (dimen-
sions A-1, 2, and 3), but go right on sug-
gesting that war is a reasonable instrument
of policy ( B-1, 2, 3, 4, and 10). They not
only attribute the most aggressive motives
to the other (dimensions C-1, 3, and 4 are
among the most frequently used by both
sets of media) and proclaim their own un-
sullied virtue ( D-1 and 2), but reject out
of hand most of the other’s negotiating
positions (D-6 and 7). As long as each
elite expresses such attitudes-and gener-
ates them within the domestic population-
it will find internal resistance to serious
bargaining almost impossible to overcome.
Our impression is that a similar analysis of
the years since 1960 would reveal some
encouraging changes in this regard, but in-
sufficient ones.
That the value systems of the two soci-
eties make further or more rapid improve-
ment of this sort impossible seems most
unlikely. Though there are a great many
value dimensions on which the USSR and
the United States elites clearly disagree, it
must be emphasized that there is a pro-
found difference between dissimilarity and
incompatibility. Moreover, the extent of
symmetry in value preferences is consider-
ably greater than the media-reading (or
hearing or seeing) public would have ex-
pected.
The problem seems, therefore, to be less
one of profound incompatibility in either
the images of the good life or the national
interests, than of a relative absence of both
knowledge and courage on the part of the
elites. Admittedly, the century of total war
and of the industrialized welfare society
makes the public education task of the elites
a most difficult, awkward, and even risky
one; but as our value analysis makes clear,
both nations tend to accept (the US more
reluctantly) the principles of executive
leadership and the need for modest risk-
taking. Surely, there must be a way in
which they can disarm their bellicose do-
mestic factions and prepare their publics
for some modest détente. If nothing else,
this study should help to identify some of
the areas in which such preparation might
begin.
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APPENDICES
A. General Instructions to Coders
We are seeking, by use of quantitative con-
tent analysis, to develop a profile of the Soviet
and American foreign policy operational codes
during the three-year period 1 May 1957 to
30 April 1960.
For each of these two nations, we want to
ascertain the articulated opinion of the foreign
policy elite in terms of its
A. Image of the international environment
B. Evaluation of the power balance
C. Evaluation of the other’s operational code
D. Evaluation of own operational code
These articulated images and evaluations will
be directly inferred by coding of a certain class
of statements appearing in certain periodicals
which have been selected as most representa-
tive of foreign policy elite opinion in each
nation. These periodicals, and the frequency
with which they will be coded, are for the
United States: New York Times, every eighth
day; Department of State Bulletin, every
weekly issue; Foreign Affairs, every quarterly
issue; and for the Soviet Union: Pravda, every
eighth day; Kommunist, every issue; Interna-
tional Affairs, every monthly issue.
B. Detailed Instructions to Coders
[Items 1 and 2 described which articles were
to be coded and which were to be excluded, in
the Soviet and American samples, respectively;
see text on &dquo;Drawing the Sample.&dquo;]
3. Use orange sheets for Soviet and green
for American periodicals, pasting the four mas-
ter codes (A, B, C, and D) along the left-
hand edge of each of the four separate sheets
used for each periodical.
4. At the top of each code sheet, write name
of periodical, name of coder, and time period
covered on that sheet. Above each column
identify the article being coded by title, author,
page number on which article begins, date it
appeared, or in any way to insure that the
principal investigator will be able to compare
the results you achieved with those of the
other coder working on the same periodical.
5. Remember that we are coding in order
to discover the position which the article takes
in its entirety; an article will be coded only
once (if at all) per dimension,. Therefore, the
entire article must be read or scanned first.
6. Then note which set of issues (A, B, C,
or D) and dimensions (1, 2, 3, ... ) are dealt
with in the article.
7. Then go back over the article in order
to ascertain where the writer (or speaker)
comes out on each of the dirrtensions covered;
i.e., is his position a, b, or c?
8. Normally you will find little difficulty in
ascertaining whether the article takes position
a, b, or c. If, however, after careful and judi-
cious appraisal, you find an article which
should be coded along a certain dimension, but
cannot ascertain whether its position is a, b,
or c, refer to item 9.
9. If the article is so ambiguously worded
that it could be coded in more than one posi-
tion, or takes two different positions, then and
only then, mark both position spaces.
10. Be absolutely certain that, as you mark
your code sheets, the mark is not only alongside
the appropriate dimension and position, but
under the article identified at the top of the
sheet.
11. Before doing any coding, be sure to
read through, at least twice, the illustrative
materials that follow. These will give you
realistic sentences and phrases taken from the
very materials we are using and show where
such statements would fall on the code sheets.
12. As you do the actual coding, if there
is any doubt as to the exact meaning of the
abbreviated position description which is on
the left-hand master codes, refer back to the
illustrative materials in the instruction manual
for the fuller description.
[Then follows a sheaf of 35 pages, one for
each dimension, and on each are illustrative
statements for each of the three possible posi-
tions within that dimension.]
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C. Tabulated Coding Results
The following supplemental tables (5
through 12) give the individual scorings of the
two coders for the three positions in each
dimension for each periodical; the average of
the scorings; the percentage distribution of this
average; and the salience ( N ) counts. In these
tables, columns 1 and 2 represent the scorings of
Coders 1 and 2; the Average columns show the
arithmetic mean of 1 and 2; the Percentage
columns show the percentage distribution of
the average among the three positions; the
Combined column is the sum of the three
averages and the percentage distribution of
these.
TABLE 5
(A) SOVIET ELITE IMAGE OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
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TABLE 6
(B) SOVIET ELITE EVALUATION OF POWER BALANCE
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TABLE 7
(C) SOVIET ELITE IMAGE OF AMERICAN OPERATIONAL CODE
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TABLE 8
(D) SOVIET EXPRESSIONS OF OWN OPERATIONAL CODE
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TABLE 9
(A) AMERICAN ELITE IMAGE OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
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TABLE 10
(B) AMERICAN ELITE EVALUATION OF POWER BALANCE
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TABLE 11
cm AMERICAN ELITE ZMAGE OF SOVIET OPERATIONAL CODE
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TABLE 12
(D) AMERICA EXPRESSIONS OF OWN OPERATIONAL CODE
